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FEDERAL TAXATION CONCEPTS IN CORPORATE RISK
ASSUMPTION: SELF-INSURANCE, THE TRUST, AND THE
CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY
I. INTRODUCTION
This age of technical, economic, and political discontinuity' has made
corporate property and liability losses a significant cost of doing business. 2
Concomitantly, there has been an expansion of the insurance industry. But to an
increasing degree, major corporations are directly participating in the risks
associated with these uncertainties, since complete risk transfer to an unre-
lated insurer is often impossible.3 Thus, alternative financial plans are devel-
oping. This Comment discusses the federal income tax treatment of the
principal methods for financing corporate self-assumption of loss from such
property and liability risks. These financing methods are retrospectively rated
insurance policies, 4 self-insurance, 5 trusts, 6 and the captive insurance com-
pany.
7
1. See, e.g., Drucker, Preface to P. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity at ix-xi (1969).
2. See D. Bickelhaupt, General Insurance 64-65 (9th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as General
Insurance].
3. A survey which reflected this phenomenon found that in Fortune's top 500 industrial
corporations, five out of six were self-insuring some portion of their corporate risk and most of
these expected their percentage of risk acceptance to increase in the future. Survey by Fortune
Market Research, How Major Industrial Corporations View Property/Liability Insurance 21-23
(Oct. 1973).
4. These plans provide that the insured will ultimately pay an adjusted premium which is
calculated from his actual loss experience during the policy term. An element of insurance, i.e.,
risk transfer, can be provided by performing this calculation after truncating the individual loss
severity at a defined maximum and establishing an absolute minimum and maximum value for
the policy premium. At the inception of the program, the insured pays a deposit, termed the
deposit premium, which is subject to the adjustments indicated above. W. Rodda, Property and
Liability Insurance 431 (1966).
5. "[S]elf-insurance is the conscious retention of risk, the level of which has been limited
within the financial capacity of the firm, emanating from a distribution of exposures which permit
reasonable predictions as to future loss probabilities." R. Goshay, Corporate Self-Insurance and
Risk Retention Plans 21 (1964) (italics removed). See generally C. Kulp & J. Hall, Casualty
Insurance 747-50 (4th ed. 1968); see also R. McRell, Self Insurance and Captive Subsidiary
Concepts 4-5 (1973). There is a consensus in favor of restricting the term to instances where there
is a structure analogous to the operation of a sound insurance company. General Insurance, supra
note 2, at 27-28.
6. Although trusts are more commonly used for the prefunding of corporate pension plans and
other employee benefits, see, e.g., General Insurance, supra note 2, at 336-37, there is no reason
why such a vehicle could not be used to prefund other corporate liabilities. For a general
discussion of insurance trusts where the proceeds of the policy are paid to a trustee who is
responsible for their investment and distribution to designated beneficiaries or claimants, see S G.
Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 29:37-:55 (2d ed. 1960 & Supp. 1977).
7. Most authorities would define a captive insurance company as one which primarily insures
the risks of its parent corporation. See D. MacDonald, Corporate Risk Control 145-SO (1966); R.
McRell, Self Insurance and Captive Subsidiary Concepts 83 (1973). McRell defines four types of
captives covering a spectrum from the "pure" captive, which deals exclusively with its parent, to
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Since most of the risk-related losses and expenses will ultimately be
deductible to the corporation, timing considerations associated with these
deductions are essential in distinguishing the various financing alternatives.
Therefore, this Comment will concentrate on the income tax and accounting
treatment of reserves for losses and expenses not yet paid. In those cases
where two distinct legal entities are involved (such as a parent and a captive
insurer), the consolidated tax and accounting positions will also be developed.
A. The Concept of Risk
Corporations, like individuals, exist in environments which expose them to
a diverse collection of risks.8 A business corporation must display a continu-
ing ability to sustain successfully the financial ramifications of risk exposure.
In this general sense risks affect all corporate activity. However, practical
usage distinguishes those uncertainties surrounding the production, financing,
and demand for the corporation's products and services as management or
speculative risks.9 Random hazard risks, 10 on the other hand, are generally
characterized as pure risks, that is to say, unlike the opportunity for both
profit and loss associated with management risks, there is only a chance of
loss or no loss.11 Examples include property loss due to fire and vicarious
liability for the tort of an employee.
Corporate random hazard risks can be conveniently, but imprecisely,
divided into property (first-party) and casualty (third-party) classes. 12 The first
the "profit center" captive, where the underwriting of the parent's risks is incidental to Its
third-party insurance business.
The single state statute on this subject distinguishes a "pure captive insurance company,"
which must generally limit its operation to "the risks . . . of its parent," and an "association
captive insurance company," which must limit its operations to members of the given association.
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-6-103(9), -103(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
8. J. Athearn, Risk and Insurance 13 (2d ed. 1969). The term "risk" has two distinct uses In
insurance terminology. The first is synonymous with type of loss, as when one refers to the
workers' compensation risk. Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1236 (unabr. ed.
1966). The second usage refers to situations where there is a potential for variation between what
is expected to happen and what might happen, i.e.. the concept of uncertainty. General
Insurance, supra note 2, at 5; R. Mehr & B. Hedges, Risk Management: Concepts and
Applications 41 (1974). In this Comment, the intended meaning should be obvious from the
context of the usage.
9. R. Mehr & B. Hedges, Risk Management in the Business Enterprise 4-8 (1963). The
authors define the concept of management risk to include the categories of market, financial, and
production risks. They also define the broader class of speculative, or dynamic, risks as
encompassing management risks as well as political risk and innovation.
10. Terminology in this area has not been standardized. One text uses the term "static risk" to
describe the same concept described here as a random hazard risk. See R. Mehr & B. Hedges,
supra note 9, at 8-11.
11. General Insurance, supra note 2, at 10.
12. Workable definitions for these two major classes can be found in Insurance Information
Inst., [1977] Insurance Facts Property Liability Marine Surety 72. However, the insurance
industry has not developed a precise classification system which has been universally accepted.
See C. Kulp & J. Hall, Casualty Insurance 16-17 (4th ed. 1968).
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is composed of risks such as fire, storm, or theft, which jeopardize the real
and personal property assets of the particular corporation. The second class,
the casualty exposures, includes various liability classifications, which are
principally automobile liability, workers' compensation, product liability, and
general liability. 13 This Comment deals exclusively with the financial implica-
tions of random hazard risks.
B. The Growth in Risk Assumption
Insurance operates as a financial mechanism where the collective future
losses of a large number of individual insureds are reasonably predictable.
Pooling such individual risks reduces the potential financial loss of any one
participant. 14 Not all risks, however, justify the procurement of insurance.
Indeed, the traditional concept of insurance is to protect against the unex-
pected event which has a substantial impact on the financial well-being of the
insured. 15
As the size of a corporation increases, its ability to sustain variations in its
earnings caused by random losses becomes great enough to make some degree
of risk retention a viable policy.' 6 Self-retention of risk has gained widespread
acceptance as a result of the economic benefits it offers and/or the absence of
any alteratives. More direct involvement in risk taking is becoming the norm
for many business corporations,17 nonprofit organizations,' 8 and government
13. General Insurance, supra note 2, at 792 n.1; C. Kulp & J. Hall, supra note 12, at 15-19.
14. Reducing risk by transfer and combination is the essence of the concepL I. Pfeffer,
Insurance and Economic Theory 53 (1956); see General Insurance, supra note 2, at 29-31.
15. See generally W. Vance, Handbook on the Law of Insurance § 1, at 4-7 (3d ed. 1951).
16. The theoretical determination of optimum retention level is often reached by considering
the impact of an unbudgeted loss on the company's present and future financial condition.
Warren, McVeigh, Griffin & Huntington, Risk Retention, Rep. No. A-12, in Practical Risk
Management 2-3 (1975). In practical terms, however, this retention level is usually established by,
using a rule of thumb relationship with annual revenues, after-tax earnings, earnings per share,
or allowable budget variation. Id. The determination of retention level has accounting sig-
nificance only if set high enough so that there could be a material effect on the overall financial
performance of the corporation, given adverse loss experience. See R. Anthony, Management
Accounting 39 (3d ed. 1964).
17. See, e.g., Cray, Insurers, in a Paradoxical Trend, Help Companies Set Up Self-Insur-
ance, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1977, at 43, col. 1; Kloman, Captive Insurance Companies-976, 3
Risk Management Rep. No. 1, 12, 12-13 (Jan. 1976). See also Stevenson, Captive Insurance-
Risk Replaces Premiums, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1977, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
18. There is a movement among hospitals to use captive insurance companies to insure their
medical malpractice exposures. Harsham, Offshore Medical Insurance: Is It the Answerfor You?,
Med. Econ., Feb. 7, 1977, at 214. Several universities, including Harvard University, the
University of Pittsburgh (private institutions), and the University of Minesota (a public institu-
tion) have begun to employ the captive insurance concept in their risk management plans.
Minnesota Sets First Publit College Captive, Bus. Ins., June 27, 1977, at 1, col. 1. Although
most of this interest among universities has been prompted by their medical malpractice
exposures, a broader captive role in the general liability area may be observed in the future. See
id. at 33, cols. 3-5.
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units. 19 Minimizing costs is the basic rationale for their policy of risk
assumption. For example, when large entities procure insurance for antici-
pated losses, the result is often a fruitless dollar trading exercise where the
insurance company simply uses the collected premiums to pay that insured's
losses. Large organizations have begun to realize that they bear the ultimate
financial responsibility for at least routine losses over an extended period of
time. 20 Insurance companies, as profit-making organizations, have invoked
this self-evident proposition by continually reviewing loss experience and
increasing rates where necessary so that collected premiums will exceed
ultimate losses and expenses. 2 1
Aside from the avoidance of expensive dollar trading, another financial
incentive for self-assumption programs is that special efforts in loss control or
safety programs will immediately return cost savings. Of course, such reduc-
tions in expected losses should also be recognized by traditional insurers who
would reduce premiums accordingly. In reality, however, this mechanism of
rate adjustment is a slow one and, depending on the size of the company,
might never be fully recognized using standard actuarial ratemaking proce-
dures. 22 Thus, the economic benefits derived from self-retention of risk are so
significant that some degree of self-retention is practiced by nearly every
major corporation in operation today. 23
19. See Hudson, Soaring Premiums for Risk Coverage Troubling Suburbs, N.Y. Times, Mar.
20, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 3; Minard, The Premiums on City Life, Forbes, Mar. 15, 1977, at 96, 98.
20. This conclusion is consistent with the concept of risk as uncertainty involving an
outcome. "Those losses which occur with predictable regularity do not represent risks but a...
cost of operation . . .which is (or should be) normally retained." Warren, McVeigh, Griffin &
Huntington, Risk Retention, Rep. No. A-12, in Practical Risk Management 1 (1975).
Acceptance of this principle has been gaining among the corporations.. Some managements, of
course, will continue to "become highly critical, and even fearful, when there is a $500 fire loss
with no insurance to cover it." Parrett, Risk Retention, in Risk Management 53 (H. Snider ed.
1964). More enlightened companies, however, recognize that "[i]t is not sound business practice
. . . to spend unnecessary premium dollars for so-called protection at exposure levels that do not
represent true 'risks' to the firm." Id. at 65.
21. There is a growing recognition that insurance companies do not shoulder the burden of
losses alone, but rather pass such costs to the insured public. See, e.g., The Litigation Binge:
Suing Ourselves into Bankruptcy, Forbes, Sept. 1, 1975, at 63.
22. Insurance rating emphasizes experience on an industrywide basis as opposed to that of
any individual company. "An important corollary to understanding the underwriting function is
the fact that most insurance prices are based upon an average rate for an entire class or group."
General Insurance, supra note 2, at 142. Standard procedures usually develop premium rates in
accordance with traditional indices of loss exposure, such as rating product liability by the
company's dollar sales volume or workers' compensation by its payroll. See J. Atheam, Risk and
Insurance 496 (2d ed. 1969). Ironically, a manufacturer who, as a result of improved safety
features, increases the price of his product could experience higher premiums because of the
associated increase in sales revenue. Insurance Services Office, Product Liability Insurance 12
(1976).
23. Many proponents of the concept of corporate risk management see the transfer of risk to a
third party by standard insurance contracts as the exception rather than the rule in structuring
corporate policy. "Contracts of insurance are the principal means for financing losses too large to
[Vol. 46
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A second motive for self-assumption of risk is the absence of an insurance
market. There are industries for which traditional insurance protection is
unavailable at any price because of the perceived catastrophic risk potential
and the relatively small premium volumes involved. 24 While risk transfer to
private insurers is impossible in such cases, the alternative of assuming the
risks of self-retention may also be unacceptable. For this reason, some form of
government involvement has been necessary either to establish an insurance
market 2s or to limit the liability of those potentially responsible in the event of
a loss.
2 6
C. The Alternative Methods of Risk Assumption
The most traditional method of effecting corporate self-retention of risk is
to contract with the insurer so that the premium is closely determined by the
actual losses incurred. Retrospectively rated insurance is an example of such
an approach. Here a contractual formula, 27 dependent on actual losses, will
absorb without help, arising from perils either too profitable or impossible to avoid." R. Mehr &
B. Hedges, Risk Management: Concepts and Applications 183 (1974). "jT]here are only four
reasons to buy insurance: only if it's legally required, only if you want an insurer to stand between
you and the claimant, only when you need the insurance company's services, and only if it is a
catastrophic risk." Business Insurance, How 100 Corporations Manage Their Risks and Buy
Their Insurance 11 (S. Alt ed. 1976).
24. For example, the total volume of medical malpractice premiums accounted for approxi-
mately 0.64% of the total premium income of United States insurers for 1975. Insurance
Information Inst., [1976] Insurance Facts Property Liability Marine Surety 11. The rising
frequency of medical malpractice claims and the ever larger awards given to claimants have
increased this figure to 2% for 1976. Insurance Premium Distribution, Best's Rev.-PropJ
Casualty Ins. Ed., July 1977, at 11. Unavailability of coverage is a common theme in many
liability areas, including lawyers' malpractice insurance. See, e.g., Goldstein, Lawyers' Malprac-
tice Insurance Rising Steadily as Claims Increase, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 5.
In summary, existence of a risk of loss is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for an
insurance mechanism. In addition, a sufficiently large number of entities must be exposed to the
same risk to make it practical to distribute the loss falling upon a few. W. Vance, Handbook on
the Law of Insurance § 1, at 5 n.4 (3d ed. 1951).
25. For example, protection from the often devastating consequences of floods is provided
through a federal insurance program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). One of
the reasons for creating the program was that "many factors [had] made it uneconomic for the
private insurance industry alone to make flood insurance available to those in need of such
protection on reasonable terms and conditions . . . ." Id. § 4001(b)(1).
26. For example, the commercial development of nuclear power has been dependent on a
limitation in liability for owners and agents for claims arising from a serious nuclear accident.
Currently this limitation is $560,000,000. Price-Anderson Act (Atomic Energy Damages) § 4(e), 42
U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
27. The usual algebraic definition of a retrospectively rated program is: Retrospective
premium = [Basic premium + (Standard premium x Excess-loss premium factor X Loss-
conversion factor) + (Ratable losses x Loss-conversion factor)] X Tax multiplier, subject to
minimum and maximum premium. Basic premium provides for the overhead, assessments,
commissions and profit of the insurer. Standard premium is usually developed from a manual
review of the traditional exposure indices (e.g., payrolls by labor class for workers' compensation)
adjusted by a loss experience modifier. Excess-loss premium factor is multiplied times the
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determine the ultimate premium if the calculated value falls within predefined
maximum and minimum premiums. If it does not, then one of the bounding
premiums will control. Hence, there is, at least conceptually, a transfer of risk
arising from two sources: (1) the insurer's obligations to pay losses when they
exceed the level consistent with the maximum premium under the contract,
and (2) the individual losses, which are totaled to calculate the actual losses in
the formula, are truncated at a predetermined maximum (the rating level). 28
Self-insurance is another financing alternative which has become practical
because of the growth in the degree and diversity of liability imposed on
corporations. Its use is affected by the nature of the given risk and the size of
the corporation. Self-insurance is not simply a euphemism for not buying
insurance. 29 It should be an explicit policy of the company to assume an
amount of risk in predefined areas, provided that consideration is given to the
financial strength of the corporation and the predictability of loss experience.
Since insurance premiums are developed with loading factors for the insurer's
overhead and profit, 30 it is often more economical for the corporation to
assume the risks of such losses than to transfer them to an insurance carrier.
Self-insurance does, of course, have limitations. The amount of loss that a
corporation can sustain is a direct function of the amount of variation in its
earnings pattern that the company believes would not jeopardize the value of
its securities. 31 In a nonprofit organization, such as a municipality or univer-
sity, there is a similar desire to avoid severe deviations from the budget
forecasts for a given fiscal period.
standard premium for the protection of limiting the individual size of ratable losses to a maximum
value. Ratable losses is the summation of all incurred losses assignable to the policy term but
individually truncated at the given maximum. The loss-conversion factor represents the cost of
claim administration. Finally, the tax multiplier reflects the cost of premium taxes imposed by the
various states. See R. Mehr & E. Cammack, Principles of Insurance 613-15 (6th ed. 1976). The
precise form of the equation will vary because of insurance company policy and state regulatory
permission.
28. Id. See also M. Greene, Risk and Insurance 655 n.8 (3d ed. 1973).
29. See note 5 supra.
30. While some lines of insurance display loss costs as high as 90% of premiurns (e.g.,
hospitalization coverages), for the typical casualty lines (e.g., automobile liability) the payments to
claimants are only 60% of the total premium. See General Insurance, supra note 2, at 32-33. The
self-insurer, however, must absorb the expense of claim administration, loss control, and state
assessments. The extra costs of an insurer (not duplicated in some manner in a self-insured
program) usually represent 15% to 20% of premiums. Examples of such costs are state premium
taxes, acquisition expenses, commissions, and insurer profits. R. McRell, Self Insurance and
Captive Subsidiary Concepts 8 (1973).
31. The relationship between earning fluctuations and security prices has been the subject of
some pioneering statistical work. The theory and its empirical support is contained in Markowltz,
Portfolio Selection, in Security Evaluation and Portfolio Analysis 407 (1972). Financial analysts
often use a five-percent variation in pretax earnings as a convenient index of materiality. Such
rules of thumb, however, must be cautiously used to avoid misconceptions. For a brief discussion
of the materiality concept and the limitations in its application, see D. Kieso & J. Weygandt,
Intermediate Accounting 34-36, 122 (2d ed. 1977); E. Kohler, A Dictionary for Accountants
307-08 (5th ed. 1975).
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The trust is another vehicle for the prefunding of self-retained risk. A trust
may be a particularly useful device for such purposes where intended for the
settlement of claims arising from a clearly identifiable group of claimants;
where maintaining direct control of claim reserves is not essential; and where
the capitalization, administration, and overhead expenses of forming an
insurance subsidiary are not justified. The use of trusts has been especially
widespread in certain employee benefit areas such as long-term disability and
medical services. 32 The trust not only provides protection to the beneficiaries,
but it also results in financial benefits to the corporation arising from the
tax-exempt status of investment earnings 33 and the reduction or elimination of
premium taxes, commissions, and underwriters' profits.
34
The ultimate conceptual step in the establishment of programs for corporate
self-retention of risk is the creation of a wholly owned captive insurance
company.35 The creation of a captive is a formalization of the self-insurance
concept. To be granted bona fide status as an insurer, a captive must be an
entity that is independent from its parent corporation. It must have a separate
management that deals at arm's length with the parent. Finally, it must, like
any other conventional insurance company, set premium rates consistent with
a profit-making motive and use its energies to reduce the losses that it
insures. 3
6
Many insurance companies have started their operations as a captive and
have subsequently expanded to accept the risks of unrelated corporations or
individuals. 37 As a practical matter, therefore, creating a captive may be the
first step in the formation of a conventional insurance facility.38
32. See LeRoux, Use of Trusts for Self-Insured Benefits Gets Double Boost, Bus. Ins., June 2,
1975, at I, col. 3.
33. This favorable tax treatment is achieved if the plan satisfies the statutory description:
"Voluntary employees' beneficiary associations providing for the payment of life, sick, accident,
or other benefits to the members of such association or their dependents or designated ben-
eficiaries, if no part of the net earnings of such association inures (other than through such
payments) to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." I.R.C. § 501(c)(9)-
34. LeRoux, supra note 32, at 1, col. 5.
35. See note 7 supra.
36. See H. New, The Captive Insurance Company (1973); Goshay, Captive insurance
Companies, in Risk Management 80-85 (H. Snider ed. 1964). Although the IRS has espoused a
policy against the treatment of captives as legitimate insurance companies under the Code, see pt.
Iil(D)(2) infra, a recent study sponsored by the U.S. Department of Commerce has endorsed the
formation of captives as one means of solving the products liability crisis. See The Research
Group, Captive Insurance Companies, in Risk MAanagement and Self-Insuring for Product
Liability Claims: Defense Planning 339 (M. Hoenig chairman 1977).
37. Developing some significant third-party business may be of substantial aid in obtaining
favorable treatment from the Internal Revenue Service regarding the deductibility of premiums
paid to a captive. LeRoux, Ford Motor Skirmish with IRS Over Captive Is Landmark Case, Bus.
Ins., Dec. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 3; Saggese, Utilization of a Foreign Captive Insurance Corporation,
1976 Ins. L.J. 525, 528-29. This mode of operation has been characterized as the "new" captives.
Kloman, Captive Insurance Companies-1976, 3 Risk Management Rep. No. 1, 12, 16 (Jan.
1976).
38. This progression has been noted as part of the life cycle of many insurance companies.
Goshay, Captive Insurance Companies, in Risk Management 85-86 (H. Snider ed. 1964).
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Currently, there is a debate as to the appropriate tax and accounting
conventions which should be applied to captives. 39 Complicating this debate
is the fact that the term "captive" is applied to a broad spectrum of risk
accepting operations.4 0 Such imprecision in terminology means that unqual-
ified statements about the tax or accounting treatment of captive insurance
companies are quite suspect. For example, a captive that exclusively writes
the risks of the parent is in a weaker position to claim the status of an
insurance company than one which, although primarily insuring the risks of
the parent, also actively solicits and retains risks of unrelated parties. In
reviewing these conflicting positions, the reader should note that the factual
aspects of a given program are as important as its formal structure in
predicting the ultimate income tax treatment.
II. THE INCOME TAx TREATMENT OF CONTINGENCIES
The income tax treatment of the various financing plans for self-assumption
of risk is closely related to the more general controversy regarding the
deductibility of contingent liabilities, which arose nearly simultaneously with
the advent of the federal income tax system. 4 1 While income tax accounting
procedures for liabilities settled and paid during the tax year are relatively
straightforward, 42 contingent or contested liabilities raise complex tax issues
under accrual accounting procedures. The vast majority of financially sig-
nificant corporations use accrual accounting procedures. 43 In such instances,
the tax treatment of contingencies has not been developed through statutory
39. The debate arisesbecause substantial income tax deferral can occur in a captive plan,
which thus provides the corporate taxpayer with a financial incentive to pursue such plans despite
IRS opposition. See generally text accompanying notes 199-210 infra. Recently the IRS added
fuel to this debate by denying a parent corporation a tax deduction for insurance premiums
paid to its foreign captive. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-35 I.R.B. 7. The action has sparked wide
industry comment. See, e.g., Roberts, IRS Axes Deduction for Premiumts Paid to Captives; Court
Test Awaited, Bus. Ins., Sept. 19, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
40. See note 7 supra.
41. United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926), i major case in this area, was decided by
the Supreme Court only thirteen years after the passage of the federal income tax law in 1913.
The Board of Tax Appeals confronted the issue of the deductibility of reserves for self-insured
losses for tax years prior to 1920. See notes 150-57 infra and accompanying text.
42. These are generally deductible under either I.R.C. § 162 as a trade or business expense
(provided they meet the "ordinary and necessary" requirement) or I.R.C. § 165 as a loss (provided
the taxpayer is not otherwise compensated).
43. Under an accrual method, income is recognized (or a liability deducted) in the taxable
year when all the events have occured which fix the right to receive such income (or establish the
fact of liability) and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. A cash
system, in contrast, recognizes income when actually or constructively received and permits
deductions only when expenditures are actually made. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i), (ii) (1973).
The Code specifically permits a taxpayer to use either a cash or an accrual system. However, he
generally must use the same method for both reporting and determining taxable income. I.R.C. §
446(a), (c). Unfortunately, these straightforward concepts of accrual and cash basis systems can
become quite complex when subjected to Internal Revenue interpretation. See 2 J. Mertens, The
Law of Federal Income Taxation § 12.03 (1974).
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or administrative methods, but has instead emerged from case law.44 Hence,
this section will focus on the precedential value of these judicial decisions as
applied to the four financing methods discussed above.
A. The Development of the "All Events" Test
The "all events" test was developed in United States v. Anderson.45 There
the taxpayer unsuccessfully attempted to defer a deduction for a federal
profits tax which had accrued, but which was not required to be paid until the
next year. The Court set forth two criteria for the deduction of expenses by an
accrual basis taxpayer:
In a technical legal sense it may be argued that a tax does not accrue until it has been
assessed and becomes due; but it is also true that in advance of the assessment of a tax,
all the events may occur whichfix the amount of the tax and determine the liability of
the taxpayer to pay it.4 6
These two key phrases have engendered a plethora of often conflicting cases
which have attempted to apply the test to concrete situations.
47
The first requirement, namely, that the amount be fixed, concerns the
ability of the taxpayer to estimate adequately the amount of liability or
expense which has allegedly been incurred during the tax year in question.
While the debate in this area concentrates on what constitutes "reasonable
accuracy" as required by the Treasury Regulations, 48 the courts have dis-
played some flexibility in determining compliance with the estimation stan-
dard.
4 9
The other element in the necessary equation is to "determine the liability,"
of the taxpayer which effectively demands the absence of a contingency in the
expense. This latter requirement has historically .been the greater stumbling
block to an allowable deduction."0 The policy behind prohibiting deductions
for contested liabilities is the desire to prevent abuses by taxpayers taking
deductions for expenses that might never occur. 51 While this concern can
44. Oshatz, Accrual and Deductions of Contested and Contingent Liabilities, 26 N.Y.U. Inst.
Fed. Tax. 747, 749 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Contingent Liabilities].
45. 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
46. Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
47. J. Chommie, The Law of Federal Income Taxation § 83, at 236-37 (2d ed. 1973). The
cases are conveniently collected in 2 J. Mertens, supra note 43, § 12.61.
48. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1967).
49. See pt. 11(C) infra.
50. The estimation requirement is largely a factual question, the determination of which has
been made easier by modem statistical methods. Indeed, courts have demonstrated a willingness
to accept such statistics. "A number of cases ... indicate that there is a trend among the courts to
permit the accrual of expenses when the liability is certain and the amount although not precisely
determinable is susceptible to reasonable estimate." 2 J. Mertens, supra note 43, § 12.61, at 232
(footnote omitted).
51. See, e.g., Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400. 406 (Sth Cir 1969)
(citing Note, Accrual Accounting and the Clear Reflection of Income: Purity of Accounting
Principles Forsaken for the Protection of Tax Revenues, 42 Notre Dame Law. 511. 520 (1967)).
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hardly be challenged, its implementation sometimes achieves a more restric-
tive result than necessary.
B. The Determination of Liability
The large body of case law does not provide a clear standard for ascertain-
ing whether or not liability has been determined. An examination of the cases
reveals, however, that four distinct considerations are consistently utilized to
determine the issue: (1) whether the liability is being actively contested by the
taxpayer, as for example, by litigating the issue; (2) whether the liability arises
by virtue of law or by contract; (3) whether the deduction for the liability
fairly reflects financial performance in light of the taxpayer's integrated
accounting system; and (4) whether there is an unreasonable delay between
the occurrence of the liability and the time the obligation actually becomes
due.
1. Actively Contested
The difficulties in demonstrating that the liability is determined are exem-
plified in Lucas v. American Code Co. 5 2 In that case, a corporation had
breached an employment contract with its sales manager and the issue was
whether the corporation could deduct the resulting anticipated damages even
though the case was still in litigation. Since such deductions would, at least in
the short term, reduce taxable income,5 3 it is perhaps not surprising that the
Supreme Court required more of the taxpayer corporation than simply the
ability to estimate accurately the unpaid liability. The touchstone employed
by the Court was whether or not the taxpayer was actively contesting his
liability. As stated by the Court:
[A] loss occasioned by the taxpayer's breach of contract is not deductible in the year of
the breach, except under the special circumstances where, within the tax year, there is
a definite admission of liabilty [sic], negotiations for settlement are begun, and a
reasonable estimate of the amount of the loss is accrued on the books.5 4
In Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner,5  the Court reaffirmed the
basic requirement that income tax accrual demands the existence of an
uncontested liability. Nevertheless, the treatment of the case exemplified a
policy of permitting the deduction where the accrual basis taxpayer has
actually paid the liability that he is contesting. Dixie Pine involved a
52. 280 U.S. 445 (1930).
53. The damages for the corporate taxpayer's breach of contract, presumably, would be
deductible if actually paid. Thus, the real impact of accrual basis deductions on the Treasury
comes from the accelerated timing-not the absolute size--of the deductions. A Code provision,
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch.1, § 462, 68A Stat. 158 (1954) (repealed 1955), which would have
significantly liberalized the rules for the deduction of future estimated expenses, was repealed
retroactively largely because of the anticipated degree of revenue loss. 2 J. Mertens, supra note
43, § 12.22c.
54. 280 U.S. at 450 (footnote omitted).
55. 320 U.S. 516 (1944).
[Vol. 46
CORPORATE RISK ASSUMPTION
Mississippi taxing authority which had declared that a solvent used by
petitioner was within the statutory definition of gasoline and hence subject to
state tax. After paying the tax for 1936, petitioner brought suit challenging the
state's action.5 6 In 1937 the taxpayer accrued the expense for the contested
tax, but did not actually pay it. As to this latter year, the Court determined
that the standard for accrual deduction had not been met."7 It is significant
that the federal tax authorities did not challenge the validity of the deduction
for 1936, nor was this treatment questioned by the Court.
A contrary position was taken in United States v. Consolidated Edison
Co.5 8 where the taxpayer was not permitted to accrue a contested tax which
had been paid to New York City authorities in order to avoid seizure of
property involved. The Court determined that a contested tax liability did not
accrue as a deduction in the year the tax was paid under protest. Despite
payment, the deduction had to be deferred to the year when the litigation was
finally terminated.5 9 Because many accrual basis taxpayers would have been
adversely affected by the application of this decision's logic, 60 Congress
adopted section 461(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 195463 which over-
ruled the decision's result, but not its reasoning. While the statute removes an
undue burden upon the taxpayer using accrual accounting, the exception
provided by the statute has limited business applications. One obvious
disadvantage is that the contested property must be placed outside corporate
contr6l. The statute does, however, leave open the possibility of paying such
liabilities to a related party such as a trust.62
2. Determination of Liability by Contractual or Statutory Obligation
The requirement of a determined liability may also be satisfied by reason of
duties imposed by law. In Harrold v. Commissioner,63 the Fourth Circuit
permitted a deduction for the cost of land rehabilitation made necessary by
the strip mining operations of the taxpayer. This program was required by
state environmental regulations, and the obligation was secured by a perfor-
mance bond. From these facts, the Court determined that the taxpayer had
incurred a definite liability. Its opinion reiterated the rule that:
56. Id. at 517.
57. Id. at 519.
58. 366 U.S. 380 (1961).
59. Id. at 391-92. This issue had not been raised in Dixie Pine because the challenged
deduction was an accrual made even though the taxpayer had not paid the contested gasoline tax.
60. Contingent Liabilities, supra note 44, at 762.
61. Section 461(f) provides: "If-(1) the taxpayer contests an asserted liability, (2) the taxpayer
transfers money or other property to provide for the satisfaction of the asserted liability, (3) the
contest with respect to the asserted liability exists after the time of the transer, and (4) but for the
fact that the asserted liability is contested, a deduction would be allowed for the taxable year of
the transfer (or for an earlier taxable year), then the deduction shall be allowed for the taxable
year of the transfer."
62. See pt. IIT(C) infra.
63. 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951). See also Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930
(3d Cir. 1959).
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[w]hen all the facts have occurred which determine that the taxpayer has incurred a
liability in the tax year, and neither the fact nor the amount of the liability is
contested, and the amount, although not definitely ascertained, is susceptible of
estimate with reasonable accuracy in the tax year, deduction thereof from income may
be taken by a taxpayer on an accrual basis."4
With regard to contractual liabilities, the parties may exercise some control
over the income tax consequences. While the requirement of definite liability
remains, Gillis v. United States65 represents the proposition that inquiry may
also be made into the substance of the transaction to determine whether in
fact liability is contested. In Gillis, the taxpayer knew that he had violated a
contractual agreement by shipping cotton of substandard quality. While the
claims had to be settled by means of arbitration, the court found that such
procedures "[were] not as adversative as usual litigation" and that, further-
more, these claims were "anticipated and [were] in the norm of the trade." 66
The Fifth Circuit allowed deduction of the liability for the claim expected
to be asserted pursuant to the export cotton contract. Since a deduction was
allowed on the basis of the loss event itself, prior to the manifesting claim, the
decision can be considered as an expansion of the standard for determining
liability. 67
3. Integral Accounting Rule
The Internal Revenue Code explicitly grants the Commissioner discretion
to reject a taxpayer's accounting system when that system does not clearly
reflect income. 68 The fact that a given convention is viewed favorably by
generally accepted accounting principles does not necessarily result in accep-
tance by the Commissioner for tax accounting purposes. 69 The implications of
such flexibility are illustrated by Schlude v. Commissioner,70 where a hus-
64. 192 F.2d at 1006. The legal obligation must be incurred by virtue of performing the given
activity. The distinction is illustrated by the denial of a deduction to an airline which attempted
to accrue the periodic costs of airplane maintenance ratably with the in-service hours between
mandatory inspections. The deduction was denied because this equipment maintenance program
was required only for future flight operation. Unlike the land rehabilitation case, the operation of
the airplane did not give rise to an absolute responsibility to perform the inspections in the future.
World Airways, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 786 (1974), appeal docketed, No. 75-2176 (9th
Cir. May 23, 1975).
65. 402 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1968).
66. Id. at 509.
67. The expansive position of the Fifth Circuit has not been maintained. In Trinity Constr.
Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1970), a deduction was denied because payment was
dependent on a condition subsequent. See notes 104-08 infra and accompanying text.
68. I.R.C. § 446(b).
69. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 252, 255-56 (Ct. Cl. 1976). For
convenience, this flexibility to evaluate a taxpayer's financial position notwithstanding generally
accepted accounting principles is referred to as the integral accounting rule.
70. 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (5 to 4 decision). Note that the issue in Schlude was whether or not
income actually received may be deferred recognition to some subsequent time period. The
Treasury Service has traditionally been quite reluctant to permit such deferral despite a host of
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band and wife operated a franchised dance studio. Contracts provided that
the students had a fixed obligation to pay for their lessons without any right to
refund or cancellation. 71 The taxpayer sought acceptance of a tax accounting
system whereby he considered as "earned income" only that portion of the
total contract price relating to the lessons actually given during the tax year.
The Court disagreed and required that the total tuition received be treated as
income. One factor in the Court's decision was that the royalty payments and
sales commissions were deducted when paid irrespective of the period in
which related receipts were taken into income. 72 It may be argued that the
Court rejected the accounting convention because it would have delayed
recognition of income in combination with an inconsistent treatment of related
expenses. 73 The taxpayer's accounting method was, however, permitted by
generally accepted accounting principles.
74
In Pacific Grape Products Co. v. Commissioner,7 5 the Ninth Circuit
allowed the taxpayer to accrue the expenses anticipated for shipping costs and
brokerage fees on unshipped fruit products. The decision turned on the
particular accounting procedures of the company, which recognized as income
the unreceived sales price of such products. Also significant were the determi-
nations that title to the unshipped goods had passed to the buyers and that the
particular system of accounting utilized by the taxpayer was common in its
industry. 76
A case indicating the multiplicity of considerations involved in the typical
tax decision is Schuessler v. Commissioner.77 There the taxpayer sold fur-
naces on which he included a five-year service contract. He was permitted to
exclude from income that portion of the sales price which related to the
anticipated costs of performing those services. 78 While the Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in Schlude7 9 established a broad rule requiring early
taxpayer's arguments. J. Chommie, The Law of Federal Income Taxation § 83, at 240 (2d ed.
1973). One basis for the Supreme Court's restrictive stance on the allocation of income is the short
lifetime of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 452, 68A Stat. 152 (1954) (repealed 1955). which would
have permitted such deferrals. See B. Bittker & L. Stone, Federal Income Estate and Gift
Taxation 836-39 (4th ed. 1972); Chommie, supra at 247.
71. 372 U.S. at 130.
72. Id. at 132.
73. Id. at 136.
74. Id. at 132.
75. 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955).
76. Id. at 867-68.
77. 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956).
78. Id. at 725.
79. See text accompanying notes 70-74 supra. There has been a marked disparity between the
expansive theories requiring early recognition of income and the restrictive concepts used to deny
a current deduction for allegedly uncertain expenses. Compare Schlude with American Auto.
Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
The distinction has a long history in the interpretation of the tax law. "The power to tax
income.., is plain and extends to the gross income. Whether and to what extent deductions shall
be allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can any
particular deduction be allowed." New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
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recognition of income, two considerations may sufficiently distinguish Schues-
sler so that it retains its vitality:80 (1) the price for the taxpayer's furnaces was
inflated to reflect the cost of the additional maintenance services and (2) the
maintenance obligation was less contingent than the requirement to provide
future dance lessons, that is, no affirmative act of the buyer was needed to
trigger the future service.
The approach of Schuessler has direct application to the deductibility of
self-insurance reserves for liabilities developed on a no-fault standard8" and
asserted during the tax year in issue. However, the absence of a fixed future
responsibility, such as that in Schuessler, would be a substantial barrier to
permissible income tax accrual despite the taxpayer's contention that such
treatment is required to match income and expense.
4. Remote in Time
Even given a defined liability, the courts are unlikely to permit a deduction
when the actual payment will be made at a "remote" point in time. In
Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States,82 the taxpayer issued bonds of $1,000
face value which were to be honored on the permanent retirement of the
airplane it manufactured. The plan was simply an inducement to potential
buyers. Although such a bond would seem to meet the "all events" test, 83 a
current deduction for the face value of the bonds was disallowed.8 4 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that payment was so far removed from the time the
obligation was incurred that the IRS was justifiably concerned that permitting
the deduction would subvert the fundamental principle of accrual accounting
that expenses be matched against income.8 5
C. The Ability To Fix the Amount of Liability
Th' determination of an acceptable standard for "reasonable accuracy" is
the second fundamental test in determining the success of an attempted
deduction. In Brown v. Helvering,86 the taxpayer raised an important issue
concerning the standard for estimation when a deduction is sought for the
collective result of a large number of individual events. The question was
whether the estimation accuracy is to be judged on an individual event basis
or on a single aggregate standard. This distinction has particular significance
80. But cf. B. Bittker & L. Stone, Federal Income Estate and Gift Taxation 840 (4th ed.
1972) (the authors conclude that the status of the case is currently unclear).
81. See notes 159-65 infra and accompanying text.
82. 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969).
83. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
84. 420 F.2d at 409-10.
85. Id. at 410. See generally 10 Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d G-2600 (Research Inst. of America)
(Apr. 1977) (Mooney is discussed as an exception to the usual rule). One analysis of the
decisions involving the current accrual of expenses to be paid in the future has noted their
conflicting results. See [1977] 3 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 20,577. Thus the IRS challenge is like a
double-barreled shotgun: it can either deny the deduction because the conditions do not qualify
under the "all events" test or because of the bar against deferral of prepaid income. Id,
86. 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
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to corporate risks (particularly for workers' compensation and automobile
liability) where annual claim counts measured in hundreds are commonplace.
In such instances, the attempted deduction represents the estimated costs of a
large number of individual and essentially independent claims. Obviously, a
standard based on aggregate results would be more easily met, thus permit-
ting a tax deduction if the determination of lidbility requirement was also
met.8
7
In Brown, the individual unit was the potential refund of commissions
already received from the sale of individual insurance policies. 88 The taxpayer
did not claim an ability to identify which particular policies would be
prematurely cancelled. He argued instead that he could reasonably estimate
the collective impact of cancellations from the much larger number of policies
written in a given year. Rejecting this argument, the Court clearly distin-
guished the standard for evaluating a similar deduction sought by an insur-
ance company. 89 The general rule is that the non-insurance company taxpayer
must comply with the "all events" test on the most elementary level. An
insurance company, on the other hand, is taxed under subchapter L of the
Internal Revenue Code and is permitted to analyze its operations on a group
basis.
There are substantial ramifications arising from the Brown doctrine which
can bar superior tax treatment in terms of matching income and expense. In
American Automobile Association v. United States,90 the taxpayer argued for
a deferral of income received in advance from members for services to be
rendered during their period of membership. The accrual basis taxpayer
allocated dues over the membership period by using statistical methods
developed from experience. The methods were designed to match the monthly
incurred costs with the income from the membership dues. The Court was
unswayed by this statistical evidence, in part because it was based on the
performance of the membership in the aggregate. 9' The fact that the costs
attributable to the service demands of any specific individual member could
not be estimated accurately was determinative for the Court.
Estimation techniques were also involved in Milwaukee & Suburban
Transport Corp. v. Commissioner.92 The earlier tax court decision had re-
jected the accrual of incurred liabilities in part because the "reasonable
certainty" standard for estimation had not been met. To support its conclu-
sion the court had reviewed individual claims comparing the initial estimated
87. That the aggregate performance of a large number of independent events can be more
accurately estimated than any single event is a reexpression of the "law of large numbers" which
underlies insurance ratemaking. See R. Mehr & B. Hedges, Risk Management in the Business
Enterprise 108-20 (1963).
88. 291 U.S. at 195. For a discussion of this case, see notes 146-49 infoa and accompanying
text.
89. 291 U.S. at 201.
90. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
91. Id. at 693.
92. 18 T.C.M. (CCII) 1039 (1959), rev'd, 283 F.2d 279(7th Cir. 1960), vacated per curiam, 367
U.S. 906, aftd, 293 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 976 (1962).
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cost with the ultimate settlement cost. "Settlements were at variance with
estimates by more than 100 per cent in 97 of [the claims which occurred in
1953] and in 102 of [the claims which occurred in 1954]." 93 The Seventh
Circuit,9 4 in overruling the Tax Court, permitted the deduction because it
found that the taxpayer had demonstrated an ability to estimate with reason-
able accuracy the collective performance of all claims. 95 The Court of Appeals
apparently believed that if aggregate performance was predictable, then
errors in the individual estimates, highlighted by the Tax Court, were
irrelevant. The validity of this approach, however, was implicitly rejected
when the Supreme Court vacated the decision.9 6
A further complication often involved in these cases is the relationship
between deductibility and conditions subsequent-those events whose future
occurrence would terminate an existing liability. Not all courts have ad-
dressed the issue, and when it has been raised, conflicting opinions have often
resulted. As discussed below, this factor is often considered as one part of the
standard for judging the ability to make a reasonable estimate of liability.
In Wien Consolidated Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner,97 the Tax Court
found that when a company pilot was killed in an airline crash all events had
occurred which were necessary to create a definite liability for workers'
compensation benefits provided that the company was not contesting its
liability. 98 However, because the corporation's statutory obligation to the
pilot's spouse ended with remarriage or death, payments owed to the widow
were held to be incapable of estimation with "reasonable certainty" since the
contingency of remarriage had substantial probability of occurrence and yet
could not be predicted in any individual case. 99 The significance of this aspect
of the opinion is unclear because the court refused to rule on whether
93. 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 1039, 1048 (1959). These statistics were from a total claim population
of approximately 400 a year.
94. 283 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1960).
95. Id. at 286-87.
96. 367 U.S. 906 (1961). The argument that estimates of ultimate liability should be judged
on an aggregate basis was squarely confronted and rejected by the Tax Court. 18 T.C.M. (CCH)
1039, 1050-51 (1959) (citing Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934)). The court found tie
taxpayer's reliance on Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.
1931), and Pacific Empl. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 501 (1935), misplaced because
Milwaukee, unlike the taxpayers involved in these cases, did not have the status of an Insurance
company. 18 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1050-51.
Although it is submitted that the proper standard of estimation should be the aggregate
standard, the Tax Court has continued to require reasonable accuracy on a case-by-case basis.
For a recent opinion so holding, see Gateway Transp. Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9131 (W.D. Wis. 1976) (involving deduction of a reserve for bill of lading losses arising from
taxpayer's freight carriage activity).
97. 60 T.C. 13 (1973), aff'd, 528 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1976).
98. As far as permitting a deduction for reserves associated with uncontested workers'
compensation claims, the case follows Crescent Wharf & Whse. Co. v. Commissioner, 518 F.zd
772 (9th Cir. 1975). The implications of such a standard for determining liability are discussed in
notes 158-68 infra and accompanying text.
99. 60 T.C. at 17.
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"statistics on remarriage would have established the amount of the liabil-
ity"100 had they been available. The Ninth Circuit's affirmance seemed to
indicate that such statistics could have saved Wien's current deduction for the
future benefits due the spouse. "By being unable to present any evidence on
the probability of remarriage, Wien failed to sustain its burden of proving the
amount of liability with reasonable accuracy."' 0 1
A different result was reached with regard to the dependent children. In
their case the taxpayer was permitted to accrue the full liability on the basis of
the years remaining until they were nineteen. The contingency of intervening
death was judged so unlikely that it did not bar determination of the amount
to be accrued.10 2 Thus, liability to the children was immediately deductible,
while the liability to the widow was deductible only as paid.
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Wien may be analyzed by focusing on the
nature of a condition subsequent as opposed to a condition precedent. The
latter must be met as part of the "all events" test, requiring that a tax
deduction must represent a determined liability.' 0 3 By definition, the former
are events which terminate an existing liability. As such, the existence of
conditions subsequent should not automatically bar a current tax deduction.
The Ninth Circuit's evaluation appears to be a good compromise. Its standard
would permit a current deduction despite a condition subsequent to liability,
if the taxpayer can prove the ability to estimate with reasonable accuracy.
This approach is different from that of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Trinity
Construction Co. v. United States. 104 In Trinity the taxpayer was obligated to
pay life insurance premiums on the lives of two key employees for a period of
ten years.10 5 After making four annual payments the taxpayer, which was
about to merge with another company, created a trust with an amount
sufficient to pay the remaining six premium payments. This full amount was
taken as a deduction on its final income tax return. 10 6 The Fifth Circuit
disallowed the deduction, asserting that the determination of liability part of
the "all events" 10 7 test had not been met because the payments were contin-
gent on "[the employees] being alive at the due date of each of those remaining
installments.' 08 Thus, the court made no inquiry into the tax-payer's ability to
100. Id.
101. 528 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 738.
103. See pt. II(B) supra.
104. 424 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1970).
105. Id. at 304.
106. Id. Note that in Trinity the tax year involved was the fiscal year which ended February
28, 1959. Id. at 303. Thus, I.R.C. § 461() (quoted in note 61 supra) was not discussed since that
section was not adopted until 1964. For a review of the use of trusts to achieve the kind of
deduction sought in Trinity, see pt. 111(C) infra.
107. See pt. II(B) supra.
108. 424 F.2d at 305. The Tax Court's decision in Tien had distinguished Trinity on the
basis that Wien owed a lump-sum amount to the minor dependents whereas Trinity %as only
required to pay the insurance premium annually when due. It concluded that the latter
arrangement made the continuing life of the insured a condition precedent, not a condition
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estimate the ultimate insurance premiums. This conflict between the circuits will
have to await resolution by the Supreme Court.'0 9
The above cases illustrate both the difficulties encountered in defining
"reasonable accuracy" for fixing the amount of liability and the need for better
means of providing taxpayers with some guidance as to an acceptable
standard. It is submitted that if a taxpayer can demonstrate that the "liability
is fixed" in accordance with the standards reviewed above, then the only
proper manner to judge the "reasonable certainty" in estimation is on the
aggregate performance of the cases or claims involved. 10 The possibility that
a condition subsequent could extinguish an existing liability should be treated
merely as one factor in judging compliance with this estimation standard-not
as an absolute bar to deductibility. With such ground rules, a reasonable
standard of estimation should be within twenty percent of the ultimate
value."' Such a guideline would serve to restrict abuses and yet would not
bar justified income tax deductions.
III. INCOME TAX IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE
RISK FINANCING METHODS
Some degree of self-assumption of risk is normal for the large corporation.
The principal alternatives available for the financial management of such
responsibilities can be classified as: (1) retrospectively rated insurance, (2)
self-insurance programs, (3) the establishment of a trust with claimants as
beneficiaries, and (4) the creation of a captive insurance company. 112 The
income tax consequences of these four financing alternatives are discussed in
appropriate detail in the following subsections.
subsequent, to liability. 60 T.C. 13, 15 (1973). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Wien decision,
but it was explicit in its rejection of the reasoning in Trinity. See 528 F.2d 735, 738 n.5 (9th Cir.
1976).
109. 3 Tax Coordinator (Tax Research Inst. of Am.) IG-2604, at 25,036 (Oct. 21, 1976).
110. See American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 714-16 (1961) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
111. In Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951) (involving accrual for land
rehabilitation following strip mining), the court recognized that "it has not been deemed essential
that the amount of an accrued liability shall have been definitely ascertained to justify deduction
from income in the taxable year." Id. at 1004. After strip mining approximately 31 acres, the
taxpayer had accrued $31,090 for anticipated back-filling expense. When the operation was
completed the actual resulting cost was $25,210.18. Id. at 1003. This computes to a percentage
difference of: ($5,879.82/$31,090) X 100% = 18.9%. The aggregate statistics in Milwaukee &
Suburban Trans. Corp. v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1960), vacated per curiam, 367
U.S. 906, aff'd, 293 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 976 (1962), which the circuit
court found acceptable, were for 1953: (($192,730.24-$254,659.00) + $254,659) X 100% =
-24.3%; for 1954: (($211,266.84-$161,136.50) + $161,136.50) X 100% = 31.1%. In Crescent
Wharf & Whse. Co. v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1975) (accruals for workmen's
compensation liabilities), the taxpayer indicated that aggregate estimates of ultimate liability had
been within 10.65% of the actual figures. Brief for Appellant at 8.
112. For a brief discussion of these alternatives, see pt. I(C) supra.
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A. The Insured Alternative
Of the alternative financial plans considered, the payment of premiums to a
third-party insurer offers the least difficulty in determining its tax conse-
quences. In general, such payments are deductible as a business expense.1 13
Given this treatment, it follows that claim payments made by the insured are
not deductible to the extent they are covered by the insurance contract." 4
When the premium is paid for a coverage period longer than a single year,
generally accepted accrual accounting principles limit the allowed deduction
to the pro-rata amount applicable to the respective years.'Is
Major corporations with large random hazard loss exposures can often
tolerate a potential variation in their operating costs by self-assuming a
portion of such risks. When corporations purchase insurance within such
levels, they often do so as a means of acquiring necessary services (such as
claims administration, statistical reports, and loss engineering)'" 6 and of
complying with statutory or contractual requirements. 1 7 Such considerations,
together with the insurer's desire to minimize its risk, can be mutually
satisfied by the use of retrospectively rated insurance." 8 Policies based upon
this concept are now used across the broad spectrum of casualty risks.' ' 9
Because, under a retrospectively rated policy, several years often elapse
before the ultimate premium for a given policy year can be determined,12 0
there is some doubt about the right of the corporation to deduct the amount of
113. See I.R.C. § 162. "Among the items included in business expenses are . . . insurance
premiums against fire, storm, theft, accident, or other similar losses .... ." Treas. Reg. §
1.162-1(a) (1975). The multiplicity of corporate risk exposure has produced over one hundred
types of specific policies. For a list of these policy types, see 4A J. Mertens, supra note 43, §
25.101 (1972).
114. Only the net amount of the loss is deductible. 5 J. Mertens, supra note 43, § 28.07
(1975). The burden of proof is on the taxpayer as deductions are not a matter of right but of
legislative grace. Id. § 28.03.
115. 1 Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, APB Accounting Principles § 1026.23 (1973).
These accounting limitations would also prevent the deduction of such prepayments for federal
income tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 461.
116. The emerging concept of a risk management philosophy captures this logic and is
exemplified by the following statement: "It is our general practice to retain risks up to
$_ per loss and insure them above these amounts. . . . Exceptions are made when it is
desirable to buy special insurance services such as loss prevention or claims adjustment." 1 M.
Lenz, Risk Management Manual, Introduction-Basic Concepts 6 (1971) (quoting Christy,
Alertness to Changing Needs, in The Growing Job of Risk Management 57 (1962)).
117. Id. § 6, Insurance 3.
118. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
119. C. Kulp & J. Hall, Casualty Insurance 935-51 (4th ed. 1968).
120. The premiums of such policies will ultimately be determined by the corporation's own
loss experience together with provisions for the service fees, claims administration expense,
overhead, and profit of the insurance company. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. The
contract will often specify that the retrospective premiums are to be computed at defined
intervals, e.g., by using the losses valued as of 6 months, 18 months, or some other time period
from the end of the policy year. Erickson, Retrospective Rating, in 1 M. Len, Risk Management
Manual § 6, Insurance 131, 152-53 (1975) (Supp. No. 21).
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the deposit (commonly referred to as a deposit premium) paid during the first
year of the program. 121 This uncertainty also applies to the intermediate
retrospective premium adjustments made at predefined intervals. These are
often paid well before all the claims are settled and hence before the ultimate
premium is determined. 122 An argument can be made that liability is not
defined at the program's inception or at the intermediate valuations because
the amount is subject to adjustment based on actual loss experience.1 23
Although this argument is valid to the extent that the deposit premium, in
conjunction with the intermediate retrospective premium adjustments, ex-
ceeds the minimum premium, 124 the IRS has, nevertheless, generally allowed
such premiums to be fully accrued as expenses. There are, however, few
decisions to support IRS policy. One commentator has concluded that a
deduction is allowed "because an expense is properly deductible despite a
contingent possibility of reimbursement in the future." 125 The question of the
timing of these expense deductions was discussed in Midwest Motor Express,
Inc. v. Commissioner. 126 There a retrospectively rated insurance policy for
automobile liability had been in effect for policy year 1948. In 1950 the
company was assessed an additional premium consistent with the contractual
formula. 127 The premium adjustment arose from a claim reserve 128 asso-
ciated with an accident which occurred during 1948 but which was not settled
until 1952. The Tax Court held that the deduction should have been taken
prior to 1952, because all the events necessary to support the deduction had
occurred prior to that time, 12 9 despite the fact that future events could affect
the value of outstanding claims and hence the ultimate premium.1
3 0
121. The general requirements for a current deduction by an accrual taxpayer are sum-
marized in Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1967).
122. Of course, the insurer and insured may agree, for various reasons, to make a final
determination for a particular year without waiting for all cases to close. Erickson, supra note
120, at 152.
123. The argument arises from cases like Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934), discussed
at notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
124. Since there would be an absolute obligation to pay the minimum premium, the Treasury
Regulations provide a basis for deducting at least that amount. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1967).
125. 3 Tax Coordinator (Tax Research Inst. Am.) W-2604 (Dec. 3, 1970).
126. 27 T.C. 167 (1956), aff'd on other grounds, 251 F.2d 405 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 875 (1958).
127. Id. at 179.
128. When a claim is reported to an insurance company, the claims department will make an
estimate of the company's ultimate liability. R. Mehr & E. Cammack, Principles of Insurance 560
(6th ed. 1976). The estimate is, of course, subject to future adjustment. At a given point In time
the difference between that estimate and the cumulative amount paid is the claim reserve. See L.
Davids, Dictionary of Insurance 159 (5th ed. 1977) (under definition of "loss reserve'). The
standard convention for retrospectively rated policies is to compute the contractual adjustment
on the incurred losses assignable to the policy. This adjustment is made at predetermined time
intervals after the end of the policy year. See discussion note 120 supra. Incurred losses are
usually defined as the sum of the amounts paid and the claim reserves for cases assignable to the
policy year. See Davids, supra at 159 (under definition of "losses incurred').
129. 27 T.C. at 187.
130. Id. at 188.
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The corporate tax treatment of the premiums for retrospectively rated insur-
ance policies may be clarified by considering the treatment afforded to the other
side of the transaction-the premiums received by the insurance company.
Under section 832 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, an insurance company
may reduce its underwriting income to the extent of "unearned premiums on
- outstanding business at the end of the preceding taxable year." 13' The Treasury
Regulations provide that credits accrued on retrospectively rated policies, that
is, instances where favorable loss experience produces a return premium to the
insured, can be considered in the calculation of "unearned premiums"' 32 even if
the credits are not actually paid during the taxable year.
Originally the IRS disallowed this deduction in underwriting income because
the insurer's liability to pay the premium credit was dependent on actual loss
development. It argued that the contingency of reimbursement meant that the
premium credit did not represent a definite liability.133 If insurance companies
were evaluated by the "all events" test134 imposed on other business corpora-
tions, 135 then consistent reasoning would require denial of the deduction. How-
ever, the Tax Court has indicated that this standard is not employed. In
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Commissioner, 1-6 that court permitted the insurer
to deduct retrospective rate credits in unearned premiums even though the policy
had not expired during the tax year. 137
The different treatment of insurer and insured potentially works to defer
income tax revenue if losses are substantially less than anticipated. The insurer
does not recognize the accrued premium credits as income because it is permitted
to include such credits as part of its deduction for unearned income. The insured
would have taken a full premium deduction for the original premium. In fact, the
131. I.R.C. § 832(b)(4)(B).
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.832-4(a)(3) (1963). I.R.C. § 832 is generally applicable to insurance
companies other than life or mutual companies. Its inclusive scope means that stock insurance
companies have the benefit of this section. Note, however, that a mutual company writing a
retrospectively rated policy could obtain the equivalent treatment under I.R.C. § 822(e)(l)-(2).
133. Rev. Rul. 67-225, 1967-2 C.B. 238, 242, overruled on other grounds, Bituminous Cas.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 58 (1971).
134. See pt. I(A) to (C) supra.
135. In fact, insurance companies are taxed under a special subchapter of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. See discussion note 201 infra.
136. 57 T.C. 58 (1971). The strongly worded opinion gave the insurance industry substantial
ammunition in its battle to avoid the application of certain standard tests in calculating
underwriting income. For a discussion of this landmark decision, see Lenrow, Does the Annual
Statement Determine Taxable Income? What Does the Bituminous Casualty Case Mean?, Best's
Rev.-Prop./Liability Ins. Ed., Jan. 1972, at 53.
137. The IRS has acquiesced in the result reached by Bituminous without explicitly stating
that the usual "all events" test was inapplicable to insurance companies. See Rev. Rul. 73-302,
1973-2 C.B. 220, 221. Nevertheless, that conclusion is consistent with the result. The tax court
decision expressly stated that the "all events" test had no application to insurers. 57 T.C. 58,
60 (1971). For a general discussion of the ramifications of the IRS acquiescence, see Lenrow, A
Prospective View of the Tax Treatment of Retrospective Rate Credits or The Internal Revenue
Commissioner Acquiesces to the Bituminous Decision, Best's Rev.-PropLiability Ins. Ed.,
Sept. 1973, at 41.
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proper treatment of the credit due should be as a prepaid expense and therefore it
would not be deductible by the insured.
The Bituminous court treated retrospectively rated policies as legitimate
contracts of insurance. An alternative treatment, to the effect that premiums
paid in excess of the minimum premium are only a deposit, would likely destroy
the deductibility of such premiums by the payer. Indeed, Revenue Ruling 67-225
had earlier found such a contract to be more than "mere bookkeeping for afee"138
because the premium was "subject to minimum and maximum limits thus
guaranteeing ... that every premium paid by a policyholder takes into account
the risk charges and loading elements."1 39
While the above discussion indicates that retrospective premiums are fully
deductible to the insured, there would seem to be a line of demarcation between
such a contract's form and its substance. 140 If that point is exceeded, then a
policy which is in form retrospectively rated insurance would be, in fact, "book-
keeping for a fee" and hence subject to the usual restrictions on self-insured
programs. 141 Retrospective plans, for example, which set maximum premiums
at levels far in excess of reasonably anticipated losses could fail if inquiry were
made into the effective degree of risk transfer.
A retrospectively rated plan can be quite similar in financial operation to a
mutual insurance company policy with a dividend feature. Many mutuals set
rates that will almost certainly result in a fractional premium return (5-10%) to
the insured in a subsequent year.142 Despite the high probability that initial
premiums are excessive to the extent of such anticipated dividends, full premium
deductibility in the year of payment has generally been permitted. 143 Such
treatment, however, is of little precedential value for holding retrospective
premiums fully deductible, since retrospectively rated policies and mutual policies
are readily distinguishable. A mutual insurance company's performance is depen-
dent on the collective loss experience of all participating policyholders. The
premium is available to reimburse the losses of any other insured. A retrospective
premium, on the other hand, is exclusively dependent on the loss experience of
the individual insured. Thus, the collective performance dependence of the
138. Rev. Rul. 67-225, 1967-2 C.B. 238, 239, overruled on other grounds, Bituminous Cas.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 58 (1971).
139. Id. A federal district court reviewing an arrangement which was in essence a retrospec-
tive insurance contract without a maximum disallowed the premium deduction. The court found
that the arrangement, which also provided the insured a portion of investment income, contained
no transfer of risk and hence was not an insurance contract. Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9526 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
140. "The taxpayer may not, of course, lift himself by his own bootstraps and secure the
allowance of a deduction through the medium of characterizing a particular item on his books
and records as an expense." 4A J. Mertens, supra note 43, § 25.13, at 85 (1972) (footnote omitted).
141. A discussion of these restrictions is contained in notes 146-57 infra and accompanying
text.
142. Judicial recognition of this practice was noted in Weber Paper Co. v. United States, 204
F. Supp. 394, 398-99 (W.D. Mo. 1962), aff'd, 320 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1963).
143. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-275, 1960-2 C.B. 43, 46 (premium deductions permitted to extent
they were not withdrawable by the taxpayer).
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mutual dividend more dearly reflects the risk distribution concept inherent in
insurance relationships.
In summary, insurance premiums paid to unrelated insurers are generally
fully deductible in the year of payment even if subsequent loss development
could produce reimbursement or require additional premium payments. It is
submitted, however, that this favorable treatment is based on a finding of
substantial risk transfer, the absence of which could engender successful IRS
challenge.
B. Seyf-Insurance
A fundamental principle in any method of insurance ratemaking is that the
expected value of the losses insured must be less than the amount of the
premium collected. 144 While for individuals there are often large variances
between the premium paid and the actual losses, for large organizations this
variability is substantially reduced. For some types of risk, these large
corporations have sufficient loss exposure to pay for their own losses over a
period of time. The insurance premium is merely a means of financing this
responsibility. It follows, therefore, that an accounting reserve which is equal
in value to the insurance premium could function to stabilize the effects of
year to year variation in actual losses-such stabilization being inherent in an
insured program. 145 This result would be accomplished by isolating the
reserve as a source of funds with which to pay losses. Good experience years
would increase the size of the reserve, thus enabling it to later pay for adverse
years. The appeal of such a plan to taxpayers probably explains why its
treatment was confronted early in the history of the income tax. Tax au-
thorities, however, drew a clear distinction between such accounting proce-
dures and the procurement of insurance.
Brown v. Helvering146 set forth the rule that contributions to reserves
providing for the future payment of contingent liabilities or expenses cannot
be accrued and deducted regardless of the reasonableness of such reserves.147
144. Vhen this axiom is not followed, the participating insurance company wvill ultimately
face ruin. H. Seal, Stochastic Theory of a Risk Business 135 (1969).
145. This simplistic discussion of an accounting reserve neglects the fundamental statistical
concept that actual losses could vary significantly from a reserve set at an expected value of the
losses. Use of such a reserve is actuarially sound only if the self-insured program encompasses a
collection of individual risks comparable in number to those required for prudent insurance
company operation. In insurance terms, the program must have a credible amount of loss
experience. This credibility standard is measured by a mathematical weighting factor which
reveals whether an organization's historical loss experience was the result of accidential "good" or
"bad" luck or was developed from true differences in loss performance. I. Pfeffer, Insurance and
Economic Theory 64-65 (1956). This credibility concept is also a means of determining the
likelihood that actual loss experience will deviate from the forecast value. For a collection of
several relevant, though mathematical, essays on this subject, see Credibility Theory and
Applications (P. Kahn ed. 1975).
146. 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
147. Id. at 200-01. The other aspect of the contingency analysis, that dealing with the
prorating of income, has received a different treatment. The Treasury Service has been far more
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Brown involved an attempt by an insurance agent to establish a reserve for
refunding commissions should the associated policy be subsequently can-
celled. The agent had developed a formula, based on experience, which per-
mitted him to estimate the fraction of commissions which would have had to
be returned. 148 In disallowing the deduction, the Court explained that an
accrual (and, therefore, a deduction) would only be permitted when "all
events" had occurred that were necessary to define a liability. 149 .
Thus, reserves set aside to compensate for possible future losses are not
sheltered from income taxes. This broad prohibition against the deductibility
of self-insurance reserves was specifically discussed in a series of decisions in
the 1920's.150
The administrative controls and the method for determining the size of such
accounting reserves have often been asserted as factors supporting the tax-
payer's contention of deductibility. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner'-" gave us an early discussion involving workmen's compensation laws.
In 1917, Utah adopted a workmen's compensation law which permitted an
employer to use self-insurance to supply the required protection to employees
covered by the act. Spring Canyon chose this approach and established an
apt to find a sufficient basis for a required recognition of anticipated income than to permit a
deduction for contingent expenses. See, e.g., Simplified Tax Records, Inc., 41 T.C. 75 (1963).
148. In the past Brown had experienced a policy cancellation rate averaging approximately
22%. 291 U.S. at 197, 201 n.7.
149. The "all events" test has, in fact, been a recurring justification for barring accrual of
liabilities even in cases where prudent business practice demands prefunding provisions or,
indeed, where accounting principles may require that such reserves be created. "The prudent
business man often sets up reserves to cover contingent liabilities." Lucas v. American Code Co.,
280 U.S. 445, 452 (1930). For a discussion of the current accounting conventions regarding
contingencies, see Financial Accounting Standards Board. Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (1975).
150. In Pan-American Hide Co., 1 B.T.A. 1249 (1925). the taxpayer attempted the straight-
forward procedure of creating a reserve for anticipated fidelity losses. The amount placed in the
reserve was equal to the monthly premiums that had been quoted from outside insurance
companies. Id. However, the Board of Tax Appeals refused to permit the taxpayer's deduction
for the amounts used to establish the reserve stating that such monies were not paid or incurred
expenses for the tax year of transfer. Id. at 1250. From the facts of the case, it is apparent that
there were no losses in 1918, the year in which the reserving procedure was instituted. Id. at
1249.
A similar fact pattern is found in L.A. Thompson Scenic Railway, 2 B.T.A. 664 (1925), where
the taxpayer was involved in the operation of amusement park facilities. In a situation often
encountered by today's insurance buyers, the taxpayer found that "[o]wing to the fire hazard and
the risk involved, no insurance company would accept insurance liability on such property owned
by the taxpayer." Id. at 665. As an alternative financing procedure, the taxpayer set aside an
amount representing the estimated minimum premium which it would have paid if any insurance
company would have taken the risk. A deduction was disallowed on the strength of Pan-
American, despite the recognition that conservative accounting practices might necessitate the
reserve. Id.
151. 13 B.T.A. 189 (1928), appeal denied, 43 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
654 (1931).
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independent operation having appropriate management and clerical personnel
to administer the compensation payments. -2 Because this operation had been
prefunded by the taxpayer with an amount equal to the premium which
would have been required had it purchased insurance from the state fund," s3
and because the fund's size had been monitored by the Industrial Commission
of Utah,15 4 the corporation contended that it should have been permitted to
accrue for income tax purposes the payments made to the fund.
The IRS disagreed, and successfully argued that mere segregation of fund
assets did not create a trust for the ultimate payment of workmen's compensa-
tion benefits.15 5 From the court's acceptance of this argument, it follows that
the decision does not apply to instances involving a bona fide trust.' 5 6
These few early decisions established an essentially unqualified principle
that self-insurance reserves are not deductible for income tax purposes. This is
so even if the contributions are the equivalent of arm's-length premiums,
insurance is not available, and the reserves established for such funds are
created pursuant to the state insurance commissioner's procedures. These
constraints have broad implications because of the extensive and growing use
of self-insurance for workers' compensation liability and other casualty expo-
sures. Unfortunately, the Board of Tax Appeals, in developing this prohibi-
tion, provided little explanation of their position. It did not inquire into
whether or not the liability had been accepted for cases not settled at the end
of the year or consider the possibility of an arm's-length relationship between
the taxpayer and a trust. Such considerations, ignored by the Board of Tax
Appeals, should be important in expanding the basis for income tax accrual in
a contemporary setting. The broad prohibition against deductibility estab-
lished by these cases is unresponsive to the complex realities involved in
modem corporate risk management. Fortunately, several recent decisions
discussed below have created some incipient cracks in this traditional bar-
rier.15 7
Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner's8 did not alter the
152. 13 B.T.A. at 190-91.
153. Id. at 191.
154. Id. at 194.
155. Id. at 197.
156. For a discussion of the role of trusts in the prefunding of liabilities, see pt. 11(C) infra.
157. Legislative relief is also beginning to be seriously considered for certain specific areas.
Allowance for tax deductible self-insurance reserves for product liability cases has been proposed
by Senator J. Culver (D.-Iowa). See S. 1611, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 58763 (1977).
A similar, though more flexible, bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives by
Representative C. Whalen (R.-Ohio). See H.R. 7711, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec.
H5685 (1977), as corrected, 123 Cong. Rec. H7158 (1977). This latter bill would use a trust as the
vehicle for the funding with stiff penalties if withdrawals are made for any other purpose. See
Geisel, Second Bill Proposes Tax Breaks for Self-Insurers, Bus. Ins., June 27, 1977, at 6, col. 1.
One authority in the risk management field argues that such plans should be considerably
broadened to provide complete tax treatment equivalence between loss retention and insurance
purchase. Goshay, Economic Impact of Self-Insurance Reserve Trusteed Funds: Product and
General Liability Exposures, 44 J. Risk & Ins. 521 (1977).
158. 518 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1975).
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accrual principles discussed above, but it did make the determination of
liability on a basis which has practical benefit to many self-insurers. The
taxpayer had self-insured its liabilities for state and federal workmen's com-
pensation claims and had sought to accrue the unpaid liabilities estimated for
uncontested claims. In the Tax Court's view, injury to an employee in an
uncontested case was not sufficient to establish the corporation's liability. 13 9
This restrictive position was rejected by the Ninth Circuit which stated that
"[l]iability is not dependent upon fault or the absence thereof, and denial of
liability by [Crescent] is extremely rare. ' 160
The Ninth Circuit separated the concepts of determination of liability and
the ability to estimate the ultimate payment which were involved with
Crescent's right to accrue the liability. The court's innovation lies in finding
that liability was determined on the physical facts of the accident because of
the "no-fault" nature of the workers' compensation law. In effect, the court
assumed that the injured worker would file a claim under the workers'
compensation law. '
61
The court discussed American Automobile Association, 162 Consolidated
Edison, 163 and Milwaukee & Suburban Transport164 and distinguished each
on the basis that the amounts involved were either contested or completely
speculative.' 65 The Ninth Circuit was unable to determine whether Crescent's
deduction was proper because the Tax Court, in concluding that liability was
not fixed, had not pursued the issue of estimation accuracy. The case was
therefore remanded to the Tax Court to determine whether the amount of
liability could "be determined with reasonable accuracy." 66
159. Id. at 774.
160. Id. at 773. Thus the court adopted the taxpayer's position that while the extent of
damages was often unknown at the time a worker was injured, the determination of such
amounts was not a condition precedent to the taxpayer's liability. "It is respectfully submitted
that the events which the lower court regarded as conditions precedent to the creation of the
employer's liability are, in fact, events occurring subsequent to the event establishing liability.
The injury establishes the fact of the employer's liability. The medical services to the injured
employee and his absence from work merely quantify that liability in dollars and cents." Brief for
Appellant, at 20, Crescent Wharf & Whse. Co. v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1975).
There was one refinement to this injury-liability link. A deduction was judged improper for
those few cases which had occurred within seven working days from the end of the tax year
because indemnity payments for workers' compensation were not due under California law unless
an employee was absent from work at least seven working'days. It certainly can be argued that
such a waiting period constitutes a condition precedent to liability rather than merely a factor
influencing damages as contended by the appellant. Id.
161. See Cal. Lab. Code § 3600 (West 1971). The language of the New York statute Is
characteristic of that adopted by many other states: "Every employer subject to this chapter shall
... pay or provide compensation for [employee] disability or death from injury arising out of and
in the course of the employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury .... " N.Y.
Work. Comp. Law § 10 (McKinney 1965) (emphasis added).
162. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
163. 366 U.S. 380 (1961).
164. 367 U.S. 906 (1961).
165. 518 F.2d at 775.
166. Id. A private settlement of the case was reached on the basis of stipulations. No written
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In summary, under an accrual based system of accounting, it is quite clear
that the "all events" test eliminates the opportunity to establish reserves for
those loss incidents which have not occurred in the tax year. Even a liability
which has been incurred during the tax year in question will not result in a
tax deduction if the underlying claim is unpaid and contested. Thus the
contingency must be funded with pretax dollars. Tax accounting requirements
and, more recently, standard accounting procedures1 67 prohibit the taxpayer
from utilizing self-insurance reserves in these instances as a substitute for the
procurement of insurance coverage. Where, however, corporate liability arises
under no-fault theories, as in Crescent, or is otherwise uncontested, deducti-
bility should rest on the ability of the taxpayer to estimate the ultimate costs
with reasonable accuracy. Furthermore, if the taxpayer can demonstrate past
ability to estimate ultimate costs to within twenty percent on an aggregate
basis, then neither the larger variances displayed in the case of individual
claims nor the mere possibility of conditions subsequent affecting the tax-
payer's liability should bar current deductibility of such reserves. 16
C. The Trust as a Vehicle for Reserve Accrual
The trust is a potential vehicle to obtain accelerated deductions for prefund-
ing incurred-but-unpaid-claims. In contrast to self-insured programs, where
deductions are often limited to the amounts actually paid to claimants, 69 a
trust arrangement would permit a current deduction for the amounts trans-
ferred to create the trust.
A trust agreement transfers the legal title of the trust corpus to a trustee and
ordinarily limits his discretion in the use and disposition of this property.17 0 In
contrast, an accounting or book reserve represents monies available for
general corporate uses to purchase additional inventory, finance expansion,
and so forth. The insular character of trusts has provided taxpayers with an
argument for deducting the amounts used to create trusts, in those cases
where the trust would ultimately be used to pay corporate business expenses.
opinion, therefore, is or will be available. Telephone conversation with Arthur B. Willis,
Attorney for Crescent Wharf and Whse. Co., (Feb. 17, 1977). While Crescent does not abandon
the "all events" test, the physical facts of an event may determine liability in various strict
liability or no-fault situations, thus placing a right to a deduction on a demonstration of
acceptable estimation accuracy. Although Crescent concerned workmen's compensation, its logic
indicates that self-insurance reserves may be deductible in other no-fault liability areas. See Lenrow
& Halpern, The Impact of the Crescent Marf Case on the Deductibility of Se.-nsurance Resrves,
Best's Rev.-PropCasualty Ins. Ed., May 1976, at 74.
167. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (1975). The FASB requirements for an accounting accrual
for a loss contingency are similar to, though less stringent than, the "all events" test required for a
tax accrual. The two essential conditions are (1) "it is probable that an asset had been impaired or
a liability had been incurred at the date of the financial statements" and (2) "[tlhe amount of loss
can be reasonably estimated." Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
168. See pt. H1(C) supra.'
169. See notes 150-57 supra and accompanying text.
170. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 2, 74 (1959).
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The early cases, however, analyzed the problem without regarding the trust
entity. For example, Greenville Coal Co. 171 involved a trust established for
the payment of liability for employee injuries and maintained by periodic
payments to the trustee. The approach was unsuccessful since an income tax
deduction was allowed only for the amounts actually paid to claimants during
that tax year and not for the larger amount transferred to the trust. The
Board disregarded the trust entity and barred the larger deduction as a
reserve.172 The opinion provided no rationale for the conclusion and little
factual background as to the taxpayer's method of determining the size of the
contested reserve.
More recently, statutory provisions17 3 have established a useful role for the
trust in risk management programs. These statutes, however, operate only
within fairly limited boundaries, especially in pre-funding contingent
liabilities. The point is illustrated in Poirier & McLane Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 174 where the taxpayer, a construction contractor, was sued for dam-
ages to properties adjacent to two construction sites. In 1964 McLane estab-
lished a trust agreement and deposited a total reserve equal in size to the
payments expected to arise out of the litigation.17 5 The trust agreement
provided that the balance of the fund would be returned to the corporation
after the disposition of the specific claims.
After establishing this trust fund, the corporation relied on section 461(f) of
the Internal Revenue Code' 7 6 to deduct the amount of transferred funds in
the year of their transfer. 7 7 The IRS opposed the deduction arguing that the
creation of the trust did not constitute a sufficient removal of control by
McLane and, therefore, did not meet the requirements of section 461(f) as
interpreted in the applicable Treasury Regulations which provide:
A taxpayer may provide for the satisfaction of an asserted liability by transferring
money or other property beyond his control (i) to the person who is asserting the
liability, (ii) to an escrowee or trustee pursuant to a written agreement (among the
escrowee or trustee, the taxpayer, and the person who is asserting the liability) that the
money or other property be delivered in accordance with the settlement of the contest
178
The Tax Court found that "[i]n no way could petitioner have reaquired or
otherwise controlled the entrusted funds until the purpose of the trust [to pay
the liabilities involved in the identified lawsuits] had been achieved."', 79 On
this finding, the court had concluded that the transaction satisfied the
171. 3 B.T.A. 1323 (1926).
172. Id. at 1327.
173. See generally I.R.C. §§ 461(f), 501(c)(9). Payments used to fund employees' beneficiary
associations are tax deductible if they qualify under §§ 401 and 404 of the Code.
174. 547 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2925 (1977).
175. Id. at 163.
176. This section is quoted in full in note 61 supra.
177. 547 F.2d at 163.
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1) (1964) (emphasis added).
179. 63 T.C. 570, 578 (1975).
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conditions for a valid transfer of control and permitted the deduction. 15 0
The Second Circuit reversed. I8 1 While the court recognized that section
461(f) was intended to remove an unreasonable barrier to deductibility when
amounts were actually paid, it nevertheless determined that the discretion
permitted by the Tax Court as to the timing and amount of such transfers
would go beyond the legislative intent 8 2 and would provide opportunity for
abuse.18 3 The court did, however, suggest that potential abuse could be
controlled by requiring that, the claimant-beneficiaries be made a party to
trust agreement.
184
The Tax Court had specifically rejected this requirement' 5 largely on the
basis that the resultant disclosure of the evaluation of the claim would destroy
one's negotiating position in a contested matter.' 86 However, the Second
Circuit stated that placing the taxpayer in an " 'unnatural litigating position'
by requiring disclosure of [his] evaluation of the claim was irrelevant."'18 7 In
that court's view, Code section 461(f) was designed to aid the accrual
taxpayer in certain limited circumstances 88 which were not satisfied in the
instant case.' 8 9
The potential for abuse which might result from permitting a deduction in
the year of the taxpayer's choice "by the simple expedient of transferring
assets to a trust"'90 was an important consideration in the Second Circuit's
180. Id. at 581. The nonrevocability feature made a stronger case for the taxpayer. See
Consumers Oil Corp. v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 796 (D.N.J. 1960) (oil company's annual
payments to a revocable trust to provide against uninsurable flood damage not allowed as a
business expense).
181. 547 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2925 (1977).
182. Id. at 166 n.10. Relying on S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in
1964-1 (Part 2) C.B. SOS, 604, the Tax Court drew the broad conclusion that the objective of
Congress was "to allow deductions for sums transferred to pay such asserted liabilities in the year
in which the related income was earned rather than in some later year when the contest over such
liabilities was settled .... ." 63 T.C. at 575.
183. 547 F.2d at 167.
184. Id.
185. 63 T.C. at 579-81. Surprisingly, in light of the regulation's wording, the majority of the
Tax Court found that such signatures were unnecessary. Id. In fact, a five-judge concurring
opinion in the Tax Court stated that if the regulation did require the signature of the beneficiaries
(i.e., those asserting liability), then the regulation should be declared invalid. Id. at 581
(Forrester, J., concurring). There is, of course, no general requirement that the beneficiaries (in
this context, claimants) have knowledge of the trust. G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts
and Trustees § 169 (2d ed. 1965); 1 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 36 (19S9); 1 A. Scott, The
Law of Trusts § 36 (3d ed. 1967).
186. 63 T.C. at 581-82 (Forrester, J., concurring).
187. 547 F.2d at 167.
188. Such circumstances include the payment of a contested tax or other instances where the
control of money or other property is, in fact, lost and there is little discretion provided to the
taxpayer as to the timing of the transfer payments. Some factual examples are presented in Treas.
Reg. § 1.461-2(a)(4) (1964).
189. 547 F.2d at 167.
190. Id. (footnote omitted).
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decision. Indeed, the facts of the case demonstrate the potential for abuse.
McLane ultimately won the underlying lawsuits and thus gained the benefit of
a tax-sheltered reserve for the years of litigation.191 The Tax Court would
have opened the door to abuse by its evaluation of the accuracy of the
taxpayer's estimation of his potential liability on the basis of his good faith in
initially setting the size of the trust. 192 This approach is in sharp contrast to
the objective, retrospective test for estimation accuracy employed in the "all
events" test. 
193
In sum, a trust provides a tax deductible method for the prefunding of
employee benefits if it is operated within the scope of Code section
501(c)(9). 194 The broader allowance of section 461(f), however, does not
generally provide a practical avenue for the deductibility of reserves for
self-insured property and liability exposures. Although, unlike the self-insurer
under the Crescent Wharf standard, 19s the taxpayer may actively contest
liability, the requirement of obtaining the signatures of the claimant ben-
eficiaries prematurely exposes the corporation's negotiating position.
For practical risk management purposes, a trust under Code section 461(f)
can only be used in limited circumstances, 196 such as a situation where the
aggregate damages have been stipulated but the allocation among the claim-
ants is in issue or where the taxpayer is not opposed to disclosure and the
claimants are willing to accept the trust property as the basis of their claims
against the taxpayer. 197 A more useful approach would be to abandon the
191. Of course, any amount so refunded generally must be included in gross income in the
year the contest was settled. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(a)(3), (4) (1964).
192. See 63 T.C. at 581 n.12.
193. See pt. If(C) supra.
194. The trust itself is exempt from taxation if it is "providing for the payment of life, sick,
accident, or other benefits to the members" of a voluntary employees' beneficiary association.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(9). The general rule that an employer may take a tax deduction for contributions
paid to such plans is discussed in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(b) (1958).
195. See text accompanying notes 158-66 supra.
196. On the other hand, New York's legislation enabling municipal self-insurance reserves
exemplifies wide flexibility by not limiting the size of the fund but only restricting its ultimate use.
See, N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 6-j (McKinney 1977). Legislation allowing corporations to establish
trusts for prefunding liabilities would likely have to impo:;e limits on the allowable trust size
although several options exist for exercising such control. Among these ate: (1) limiting the size to
what would have been the reasonable cost for insurance, or (2) limiting the maximum size to a
specific fraction of the taxpayer's gross receipts. Both of these concepts raise serious practical
difficulties. In the former, insurance in a traditional form may be unavailable at any price and, In
the latter, corporations display tremendous variability in the relative cost of random hazard risks
to their operations. A more workable solution is to require the taxpayer to forecast the size of the
required trust on an annual basis and to provide penalties if the actual payments vary by more
than twenty percent from the forecast.
197. A recent legislative proposal for providing relief to self-insurers against product liability
would create a tax deduction for monies placed into a trust for the ultimate settlement of such
claims. See discussion note 157 supra.
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signature requirement and to impose an objective test1 98 for estimation
accuracy.
D. The Captive Insurance Company
1. The Rationale for Creation
The principal driving forces underlying the reation of a captive insurance
company are potential cost savings and increased flexibility in the parent
corporation's risk management program. The financial benefit has three
potential sources: lower operating expense, income tax deferrral, and econo-
mies in purchasing reinsurance protection as compared to alternative insured
or noninsured plans. 199 The captive, given an adequate premium income, can
reduce insurance expenses because it is a vehicle for funding the corporation's
risk exposure without the loss of underwriting profits or investment income.
While a legitimate ratemaking procedure for a captive must provide for
profit, overhead, and acquisition expense, these amounts will often be less
than the equivalent provisions required by an unrelated insurer. Furthermore,
they are retained within the framework of the corporate family.
Income tax ramifications, the second source of potential financial benefit,
depend on defining the relationship between the captive and the parent. If,
contrary to the IRS position,2 00 the captive is granted the status of a bona fide
insurance company, then net cost savings can arise which are greater than
those achieved by self-insured or retrospectively rated insurance programs.
This occurs, in part, because of the specialized federal income taxation rules
applicable to insurance companies.20
One might intuitively suppose that the tax treatment of insured and insurer
would tend to offset one another because a deduction to the insured would be
income to the insurer. Such a cancellation does not occur, however, because
of the advantageous income tax treatment granted insurance companies.
These tax advantages stem from two major sources: (1) the exclusion of
"unearned premiums" from the insurer's gross income,202 and (2) the right to
deduct incurred losses and expenses not limited to those actually paid from
current income. 20 3 Since a premium paid to a captive would be a business
198. A recommended standard for such a test is that the taxpayer demonstrate an ability to
estimate within twenty percent of the ultimate value. See pt. H(C) supra.
199. See generally Warren, McVeigh, Griffin & Huntington, Captive Insurance Companies,
Rep. No. A-16, in Practical Risk Management (1976) [hereinafter cited as Captive Insurance
Companies]; Kloman, The Captive Life Insurance Company, Financial Executive, Mar. 1972, at
44; Pine, The Case for 'Captive' Insurers, 1972 Harv. Bus. Rev. 142; Saggese, supra note 37, at
527-28.
200. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-35 I.R.B. 7. The position of the IRS is discussed at
notes 211-16 infra and accompanying text.
201. Insurance companies are taxed in accordance with the provision of chapter 1, subchapter
L of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Code essentially distinguishes life, mutual, and
stock insurance companies. I.R.C. §§ 801-844.
202. I.R.C. § 832(b)(1), (b)(4).
203. I.R.C. § 832(b)(5)(B), (c)(4).
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expense, 20 4 the net result of the transaction is that the insured parent receives
the accelerated deduction of the unpaid liabilities which could not generally
be achieved under self-insurance plans.
20 5
A third financial advantage arising from the use of the captive is the
opportunity provided to deal directly with reinsurance markets. Even regular
insurance companies, as well as captives, rarely retain the full amount of risk
on the policies they write. Instead, they use the mechanism of reinsurance to
pass off layers of risk, thus providing stability in their underwriting results.
2 0 6
Some authorities have stated that access to such reinsurance markets means,
in effect, the ability to buy insurance at wholesale rates. While the extent of
these savings may be debated, 20 7 it seems clear that dealing with reinsurance
markets allows the insurance buyer flexibility in transferring risk.
In addition to financial benefits, there can be management incentives for
the creation of a captive insurance company. Among these is the centraliza-
tion of all the risk management activities of a major corporation. The captive
can become a vehicle for monitoring this financial responsibility, administer-
ing the determination of premiums for the various corporate divisions or
subsidiaries, and controlling the corporate-wide loss control and safety
programs. Because a captive is a profit center, the corporation is afforded an
objective means of measuring its performance by comparing its operating
characteristics with those of other insurance companies. 20 8
Whether the positive factors discussed above20 9 are sufficient to compensate
for the extra administrative and managerial costs of a captive requires an
in-depth financial analysis. The analysis should consider the anticipated rate
of actual pay out of incurred liabilities and expenses (and thus, the investment
income potential associated with incurred-but-not-paid losses); the additional
management and accounting fees required for the operation of a captive; the
assessment of state premium taxes and the possibility of federal excise taxes;
and, the opportunity cost associated with the capital and the surplus funds of
the captive required to provide sufficient financial resources in case of adverse
loss experience. 2 10
204. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1975).
205. The Crescent Wharf line of reasoning, in the self-insurance context, would provide for
such an accelerated deduction only if far more stringent conditions were met, i.e., that the
liability not be contested and the amount be capable of estimation. See notes 158-66 supra and
accompanying text.
206. General Insurance, supra note 2, at 165-67.
207. Both sides of this contention are discussed in Goshay, supra note 38, at 112-13. A more
recent review has indicated that direct access to reinsurance markets is the most important reason
for forming a captive. Captive Insurance Companies, supra note 199, at 1.
208. Goshay, supra note 38, at 116-18. The captive concept is, however, not a panacea for
risk management problems. For a balanced discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the
captive concept, see Palmer, Captive Insurance Companies--Caveat Emplorl, Best's Rev.-
Prop./Liability Ins. Ed., May 1974, at 28.
209. See notes 199-208 supra and accompanying text.
210. See generally Stevenson, Captive Insurance-Risk Replaces Premiums, N.Y. Times,
May 29, 1977, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
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2. The IRS Challenge
The IRS, in reviewing the relationship between a parent corporation and its
captive insurance company, concentrates on two major areas: first, the
captive's status as a bona fide insurance company and, second, the nature of
the contractual relationship between the captive and the parent. While there
have been no court decisions refining the issues, unequivocal IRS policy
opposes the use of a captive and it will routinely challenge the deductibility of
premiums paid by the parent to the captive.2 1 1 This policy has been indicated
in some administrative procedures, 21 2 in preparatory documents filed in cases
now in litigation, 21 3 and in a recent revenue ruling.
2 14
The IRS employs three principal lines of attack against the use of a captive.
The first argument is that the contract between captive and parent is not one
of insurance because the common economic position of the related parties
means that no risk shifting or risk distribution has occurred. Thus, the
amount of premium paid to a captive is not an expense "paid or incurred" in
the taxable year and may only be deducted to the extent otherwise permitted
self-insurers under the constraints of code sections 162 and 165.215 Second,
211. The lack of a precise definition for "captive" insurance companies can lead to confusion.
The IRS position clearly applies to foreign domiciled captives exclusively insuring or reinsuring
the risks of its parent corporation. It has been generally believed that if premium income from
insuring the risks of unrelated parties is above some fraction of the captive's total income, then
the taint of parent-captive dealing would be removed. A minimum fraction of unrelated premium
income is not defined at this point. See discussion note 37 supra.
The economic family theory which the IRS espoused in Revenue Ruling 77-316 may exclude
the above means of removing the parent-captive taint. This theory would deny the insured-
insurer status between parent and wholly owned insurance subsidiary whenever the "ultimate
economic burden of loss [is on] the same persons who suffer the loss." Rev. Rul. 77-316. 1977-35
I.R.B. 7-8. The IRS view expressed in the above revenue ruling could be interpreted to bar the
parent's-premium deduction to the extent the captive retained the risk regardless of the volume of
the captive's unrelated premium income. See discussion note 214 infra.
212. See IRS, Captive Offshore Insurance or Reinsurance Companies, Manual Supplement
42G-256, amend. 1, §§ 3.01, .03 (Jan. 10, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Manual Supplement].
213. Notice of Deficiency (L-21) from D. Alexander (Comm'r of IRS) to Ford Motor Co. (Jan.
29, 1975) (reference L-21 Code 430) (see Explanation of Adjustments, item (a)); Notice of
Deficiency (L-21 AD) from D. Alexander (Comm'r of IRS) to Carnation Co. (March 31, 1976)
(reference Ap:LA:NEE:CLH:90-D) (see Explanation of Adjustments, item (a)). For a brief
discussion of the issues, see LeRoux, Ford Motor Skirmish with IRS over Captive Is Landmark
Case, Bus. Ins., Dec. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 3, and LeRoux, Carnation vs. IRS in Key Captive Case,
Bus. Ins., Dec. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
214. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-35 I.R.B. 7. Three different sets of circumstances are de-
scribed in the revenue ruling- (1) insurance premiums paid directly to a captive. (2) insurance
premiums paid to a commercial insurer which reinsured 95% of the risk to the captive, and (3)
insurance premiums paid directly to a captive with 90% of the risk reinsured in the commercial
reinsurance market. In all three cases, the ruling states that the net premium amount which
ultimately resides in the captive insurance company is not deductible by the parent. In short, the
independent existence of the captive insurance company is disregarded to the extent that it
actually bears the risks of the parent. Id. at 7-8.
215. The tax treatment of self-insured plans is discussed in pt. 1I(B) supra.
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the IRS contends that deductibility of premiums paid to the captive should be
disallowed under section 269 of the Code since the captive was formed for the
"principal purpose" of securing a tax advantage to which the corporation was
not otherwise entitled. The third argument is that the amount of premium
paid to a captive may represent an excessive deduction to the parent because
of improper allocation of income and expense between the captive and the
parent corporation under section 482. This third attack requires an analysis of
the ratemaking procedures of the captive to determine if those rates reflect the
legitimate economies resulting from the status of the parties. 21 6
It is submitted that a viable defense to the first argument requires that the
captive be organized and operated as a bona fide independent company. Since
the IRS will examine the substance of the relationships rather than rely on
legal formalisms, a reasonable starting point for review is the definition of an
insurance company which is provided in the Treasury regulations. 2 17 If
properly organized, the captive should be predominantly involved in conduct-
ing an insurance operation. However, the fact that all, or essentially all, of
the risks involved are those of the parent corporation, raises a question of
whether the parent-captive relationship can be considered one of insured to
insurer. 218 In this situation, the IRS might argue that the captive's "primary
and predominant business activity"2 19 was the investment management of the
loss reserves and capital rather than the issuance of insurance contracts. 220
A meticulous analysis of the relationship between parent and captive is
216. Manual Supplement, supra note 212, § 3.01(4). Although the Manual Supplement Is
specifically directed to "the treatment of premiums paid to... captive offshore casualty insurance
... companies .... id. § 1 (emphasis added), the general consensus in the insurance industry is
that this policy is also applicable to domestic captive insurance companies since the IRS argument
does not depend on the domicile of the captive, see Captive Insurance Companies, supra note 199,
at 4.
217. "Insurance company. (1) The term 'insurance company' means a company whose
primary and predominant business activity during the taxable year is the issuing of insurance or
annuity contracts or the reinsuring of risks underwritten by insurance companies. Thus, though
its name, charter powers, and subjection to State insurance laws are significant in determining
the business which a company is authorized and intends to carry on, it is the character of the
business actually done in the taxable year which determines whether a company is taxable as an
insurance company under the Internal Revenue Code." Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a)(1) (1972).
218. The IRS, while stating that its analysis "recognizes [the captive] as [an] independent
corporate entitfy]," concludes that no insurance can arise within one "economic family." Rev.
Rul. 77-316, 1977-35 I.R.B. 8. The definition of economic family will be developed in future
regulations or statutes and will probably be litigated.
219. Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a)(1) (1972).
220. See Alinco Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 336 (Ct. Cl. 1967), where the validity
of a limited purpose reinsurer of credit insurance was upheld against challenge. Thus, the IRS
does not have an overwhelmingly strong argument based solely on the status of the parties. The
case is discussed in more detail at notes 248-54 infra and accompanying text. Arguments on
behalf of the captive's status as a bona fide insurance company vis-ai-vis its parent, have assumed
that some risk of loss does reside in the captive. An insurance company that disposes of all its
insurance business through reinsurance contracts ceases to be an insurance company under the
Code and would be taxed as an ordinary corporation. See Rev. Rul. 56-106, 1956-1 C.B. 313.
[Vol. 46
CORPORATE RISK ASSUMPTION
clearly necessary. This relationship is usually documented in the insurance
contract, which can provide for risk shifting and risk distribution. 22 I The risk
shifting concept requires that the premium payment has relieved the insured
party from some defined risk of contingent loss, while risk distribution
involves placing the insurer in the position of underwriting a common risk
from a number of insureds. The exact definition of these terms, however, has
not been developed. Furthermore, there is no quantitative measure of the
necessary extent to which these features must be present in a contract to show
compliance with the standard.
The first element that would demonstrate effective risk shifting is that the
captive have sufficient financial capacity to fulfill its risk retention respon-
sibilities. Risk shifting is classically achieved by the issuance of guaranteed
cost insurance programs. That is, a program in which the risk of loss-within
predefined limits-is transferred to a third-party for a fixed price. However,
contemporary insurance programs for large corporations increasingly employ
retrospectively rated policies which reduce the potential variance between the
ultimate premium and the realized losses. 222 Yet these retrospectively rated
policies are accepted as insurance contracts. 22 3 The use of these insurance
contracts by a captive would reduce the degree of risk transfer because,
subject to the retrospective premium limits, the actual losses would determine
the ultimate premium. This plan, if carried to the extreme of providing
coverage equal to the premium, would severely weaken the captive's defense
against a charge of a lack of risk shifting.2 2
4
The captive's ability to perform on its obligations can be demonstrated by
organizing and operating the captive with a level of capitalization and surplus
consistent with the risks insured. The capital should also be measured against
the various rules of thumb employed in the insurance industry and often
reflected in state regulatory requirements. 22 1
Furthermore, the solvency of the captive should be protected by procuring
reinsurance so that the risk retained by the captive is consistent with its
premium and capital position.2 2 6 The equivalent result may be achieved by
221. See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
222. For a general discussion of retrospectively rated insurance programs, see notes 118-43
supra and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-225, 1967-2 C.B. 238, 239, overruled on other grounds,
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 58 (1971).
224. See discussion of Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941), at notes 240-42 infra and
accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 311 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1977). This section defines the
minimum capitalization requirements as a function of the type of insurance underwritten. For
example, $300,000 is the amount established for personal injury liability insurance or workmen's
compensation and employers' liability insurance. Id. § 31 1(1)(c). Another limitation on minimum
capitalization is the generWa requirement that "no insurer ... shall expose itself to any loss on any
one risk in an amount exceeding ten per cent of its surplus to policyholders." N.Y. Ins. Law § 47
(McKinney 1966). Thus, writing a policy covering up to $100,000 per workmen's compensation
loss occurrence would impose a surplus requirement of $1,000,000.
226. The fact that a reinsurance company is willing to offer coverage to the captive is itself an
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the two-stage process whereby the parent insures directly with an independent
insurer and the captive accepts a predefined amount of reinsurance from that
primary insurance company. Such a plan not only limits the liability of the
captive but also provides a means for the parent to avoid a direct relationship
with the captive. 227
The second element necessary to demonstrate effective risk shifting to the
captive would be that the premium charged is one which would characterize
an arm's-length relationship. The parent can hardly claim that a valid
insurance contract exists when the risks transferred are expected to produce
losses in excess of the premium-excesses which will be the ultimate responsi-
bility of the parent corporation. 228
United States v. Weber Paper Co. 229 defined one boundary in this relatively
undefined area of the law. The case involved the operation of a reciprocal
insurance company providing flood insurance to its participants. The cover-
age arrangements were quite simple. Each subscriber obtained insurance
protection equal to his premium plus the accumulated level of premium
deposits based on the experience of prior years.230 The company had been
organized because the area had suffered several serious floods and no insur-
ance protection had been available, from private or government sources. 23 1
The corporate insureds took a tax deduction for the premium as a business
expense which the IRS challenged, claiming that the "premium" was not
deductible as it was merely a deposit with no real risk shifting. 232 Although
the subscribers were permitted to take the deduction, the circuit court's
opinion was sympathetic to the logic of the Government's position, that the
indication of the captive's economic independence. Indeed, captive insuri.nce companies may
themselves become providers of reinsurance capacity as such companies seek to obtain business
from unrelated parties. The concept of captives as a "third market" has been discussed in
Kloman, Captive Insurance Companies-1977, 4 Risk Management Rep. No. 1, at 6 (1977).
227. The absence of such direct relationship has not removed IRS objection. See discussion
note 214 supra. A reinsurance arrangement was used in the Carnation Company program where
Carnation's property insurance was written directly with the American Home Assurance Co.,
which in turn reinsured 90% of the exposure with Three Flowers Assurance Ltd., a captive of
Carnation. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, petition docketed, No. 5793-76 at 6-7 (T.C. June
23, 1976). A major incentive for the use of reinsurance captives is that many forms of insurance
impose severe regulatory controls on insurance contracts, whereas reinsurance agreements, i.e., a
relationship between insurers, are far less restricted. For example, the Colorado statute generally
prohibits a captive from accepting insurance except from its parent, whereas reinsurance business
is not so restricted. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-6-104-(1)(b), (2) (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976). The point is
discussed in Barnes, The Colorado Captive Insurance Company Law: An Answer to IRS
Objections?, 1977 Ins. L.J. 85.
228. Of course, the insolvency of the insurer constitute; a breach of contract, and the insured
would have a basis for a claim for damages as a creditor of the insolvent company. 2 G. Couch,
Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 22:68, at 756 (2d ed. 1959).
229. 320 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1963), aff'g 204 F. Supp. 394 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
230. Id. at 203.
231. Id. at 201.
232. 204 F. Supp. 394, 399-400 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
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premiums were nothing more than deposits retrievable at the taxpayer's
whim.
2 3 3
The principal questionable practices were: (1) the subscribers had extremely
flexible cancellation rights; 234 (2) on cancellation, subscribers could "recapture
99% of [their] annual premium deposit... on 60 days' notice . . .";23s and (3)
the nature of the flood risk was such that all subscribers would be likely to
sustain a concurrent loss, particularly because the subscribers were classified
as those "whose insured properties or businesses are located in the same flood
district ... .,"236 Balanced against these considerations was the pressing need for
some form of flood protection, which apparently could not be satisfied from
private insurance sources. Furthermore, the structure of the plan involved a
collection of independent subscribers and the organization was supervised by
the Superintendent of Insurance in Missouri. 237
Contractual arrangements between the corporate insured and the captive
could eliminate some of the obvious weaknesses raised in Weber. Neverthe-
less, the parent-captive relationship is on inherently weaker ground than such
pooling relationships because of the absence of risk distribution among a
group of insureds. 238 If the IRS requires that insurance contracts contain
some degree of risk distribution, that is, a sharing of the risk of loss among a
number of independent insureds, then a captive which writes the risks of the
parent exclusively fails to qualify by definition.2 39
The requirement for risk distribution as a necessary attribute of an insur-
ance contract is based on the Supreme Court's language in Helvering v. Le
Gierse.240 However, the facts of that case reveal that the issue was only one of
lack of risk shifting, not a lack of risk distribution. In Le Gierse, a decedent,
at the age of 80, had executed a $25,000 insurance contract for a premium of
$22,946. The insurer had also required the simultaneous execution of a
separate annuity contract entitling decedent to receive $589.80 annually for as
long as she lived. The consideration for the annuity was $4,179.241 Although
the contracts were legally distinct, the Supreme Court considered both and
recognized that their combined effect nullified any risk shifting to the in-
surer. 242 The Court's decision was based on the effective operation of the
contractual terms. While a contractual relationship between insurer and in-
233. 20 F.2d at 204.
234. Id. (permitted on five days notice).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 203.
237. Id. at 202.
238. It should be noted that the IRS has not acquiesced in the Weber position. Rev. Ril.
64-72, 1964-1 C.B. 85.
239. This is essentially the conclusion urged by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-35 I.R.B.
7. See discussion note 214 supra.
240. 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941). Note that in reviewing this case, the Treasury Service used the
language "an element of risk-shifting or risk-distributing is one of the requisites of a true
insurance contract." Rev. Rul. 60-275, 1960-2 C.B. 43, at 45 (emphasis added).
241. 312 U.S. at 536.
242. Id. at 540-41.
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sured which transfers no risk would properly fail to be granted the status of
an insurance contract, it is improper to extend Le Gierse to void a contract
between parent and captive which does transfer the risk of loss and where
that captive can demonstrate the requisite financial capability.
There is a further reason why risk distribution is not a sine qua non of an
insurance contract. Most state statutes define insurance in a way that clearly
embraces situations where there are only two parties. 243 Since the states are
the principal regulators of insurance companies, these statutes should be a
majox influence on IRS policy. 244
The discussion above has addressed the essential requirements associated
with risk shifting and discounted the necessity for risk distribution to charac-
terize an insurance contract. If the latter is a requirement, the most effective
response is to have the captive broaden its portfolio of risks to generate some
fraction of its premium income from the insurance of risks outside those of the
parent.245 This would permit the captive to demonstrate a degree of risk
distribution. When the business mix reaches some threshold, there can be no
doubt as to the bona fide nature of the captive as an insurance company.
While some experts have indicated that "10% is certainly significant and 5%
may be enough," 24 6 the definition of an acceptable lower boundary is still a
matter to be developed by the judicial process.
The second potential contention of the IRS is that the parent insured
corporation created the captive subsidiary for the "principal purpose" 247 of
acquiring a deduction not otherwise available to the parent. This challenge to
the use of an insurance subsidiary was rejected in Alinco Life Insurance Co.
v. United States,24 8 which involved the operation of a credit life reinsurance
company writing primarily the credit life risk of clients of the parent finance
company. The insurance was directly written by an independent insurer that
had the necessary expertise to operate a credit life company. A reinsurance
243. E.g., the New York statute provides: "The term 'insurance contract,' as used in this
chapter, shall . . . be deemed to include any agreement or other transaction whereby one party,
herein called the insurer, is obligated to confer benefit of pecuniary value upon another party,
herein called the insured or the beneficiary, dependent upon the happening of a fortuitous event
in which the insured or beneficiary has, or is expected to have at the time of such happening, a
material interest which will be adversely affected by the happening of such event." N.Y. Ins.
Law § 41(1) (McKinney 1966) (emphasis added).
244. Congress has clearly expressed its desire that the insurance industry shall be regulated by
the states rather than by the federal government. "Congress hereby declares that the continued
regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest,
and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States." McCarran-Ferguson Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1011 (1970).
245. See Barnes, The Colorado Captive Insurance Company Law: An Answer to IRS
Objections?, 1977 Ins. L.J. 85, 87.
246. See LeRoux, Ford Motor Skirmish with IRS over Captive Is Landmark Case, Bus. Ins.,
Dec. 1, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
247. I.R.C. § 269(a).
248, 373 F.2d 336, 341 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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relationship existed between this primary insurer and Alinco under the terms
of which Alinco reinsured eighteen percent of all the credit life risks of the
primary company.
249
Fundamental to the court's rejection of the section 269 violation was its
conclusion that several valid business motives supported the creation of
Alinco. Furthermore, the court cited with approval United States v. Cumber-
land Public Service Co. 2 50 for the proposition that "even a 'major motive' to
reduce taxes will not vitiate an otherwise valid and real business transac-
tion. '2 1 In Alinco, the nature of the credit life insurance business provided
ample reason for the creation of Alinco.2 52
The c6urt in Alinco also considered the special status that state laws have
in the regulation of insurance companies. The court stated that "the Internal
Revenue Service may not employ the Federal tax laws in an effort to enforce
its own concept of what state law should, or should not, be. ' 2S3 In so ruling,
the court was especially concerned that the application of the Internal
Revenue laws might become an indirect means of regulating insurance
companies-a task which has clearly been left to state authority.2 4
The "principal purpose" challenge can thus be refuted by a showing that
nontax incentives were fundamental in organizing the captive. Several such
reasons for operating a captive have been previously discussed. 2s" As long as
such purposes are present and the captive participates in an arm's-length
relationship with the parent, this attack should fail.
The third principal argument against the use of a captive relies on Internal
Revenue Code section 482, which raises the issue of whether the premiums
between the related parties clearly reflect their incomes. The primary concern
of the IRS is that related parties will allocate their aggregate income and
expenses in a manner to reduce improperly the total taxable income.S 6
In using this challenge, the IRS necessarily accepts the independent status
of the captive insurance company. Thus, only questions of income allocation
between the parent and the captive may be raised rather than a fundamental
challenge to the economic reality of the captive. Section 482 should not pose a
problem for the properly organized captive because its ratemaking methods
249. That is, Alinco received eighteen percent of the premiums and was responsible for
eighteen percent of the losses. Id. at 339.
250. 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
251. 373 F.2d at 343.
252. Credit life insurance, at the time of the decision, was marketed as a secondary aspect of
a loan transaction so that borrowers were generally insensitive to high premiums. These
conditions raised the issue of how the profits could be shared between the credit company and the
primary insurer. The reinsurance arrangement provided such a mechanism, and it did not raise
various legal problems as did alternatives such as receipt of commissions or retrospective
premium adjustments. Id. at 338-43.
253. Id. at 345.
254. Id. See also discussion note 244 supra.
255. See notes 199-210 supra and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., South Texas Rice Whse. Co. v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 890, 898 & n. 19 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1967).
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would have eliminated any fees which, because of the relationship of the
parties, may not conform to usual insured-insurer convention. For example, if
the captive is in the position of operating with lower costs for business
acquisitions, commissions, or other expenses as compared to independent
insurers, then the premiums charged should be somewhat below those of the
market. Such discounts, however, must not be so excessive as to be inconsis-
tent with the risk transferred.
25 7
There are to date no cases which serve to indicate the effectiveness of the
IRS triple challenge developed above, or conversely, the viability of the
captive insurance concept. The insurance industry has anxiously awaited a
definitive court decision for the past several years. 258 While great publicity
has been achieved by those cases which have begun the litigation process, 25 9
the lengthy procedural mechanics of the Tax Court 260 and the clear possibility
of a private settlement have so far contributed to the absence of any court
guidelines.
The first of these litigations is Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner,26, which
involves the operation of a foreign insurance subsidiary (Transcon) writing
insurance for Ford's non-U.S. operations. The operating characteristics of the
captive indicated that it was adequately capitalized and staffed with knowl-
edgeable personnel. 262 The business incentives for the operation included
reduction of the costs which the foreign subsidiaries would have been required
to pay to independent insurers and provision of these subsidiaries with types
of coverage not otherwise available. 263 Ford stated that the captive was now
providing reinsurance coverage "to wholly unrelated parties at rates estab-
257. Insurance ratemaking procedures are dependent on the type of risk and on the loss and
exposure data available. For a nontechnical discussion of this process, see D. MacDonald,
Corporate Risk Control 75-90 (1966). As an example of such considerations, if the insurance
coverage were negotiated between captive and parent without the mediation of a broker, his
commission would be saved. While the premiums should reflect this lower cost, the courts have
been reluctant to extend this logic to distribute income to an entity which by law could not have
directly received the disputed income. See, e.g., Commissioner v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S.
394, 404-05 (1972) (bank prohibited by law from receiving insurance commissions cannot have
such commissions assigned to it on a § 482 allocation).
258. The publication of Rev. Rul. 77-316, see note 214 supra, has only heightened the
insurance industry's need for a definitive resolution.
259. See LeRoux, Ford Motor Skirmish with IRS over Captive Is Landmark Case, Bus. Ins.,
Dec. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 3; LeRoux, Carnation vs. IRS in Key Captive Case, Bus. Ins., Dec. 27,
1976, at 1, col. 1.
260. After receipt of a notice of deficiency, the taxpayer has ninety days to file a petition with
the Tax Court for a review of the deficiency. During the pendency of this automatic appeal no tax
collection can be made. I.R.C. § 6213(a). Furthermore, the parties to the tax court action have an
automatic right of appeal to the appropriate federal circuit court of appeals. I.R.C. §§ 7482, 7483;
see J. Chommie, The Law of Federal Income Taxation § 301 (2d ed. 1973).
261. Petition docketed, No. 3660-75 (T.C. Apr. 25, 1975).
262. Petition for Appellant at 7, Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner, petition docketed, No.
3660-75 (T.C. April 25, 1975).
263. Id. at 6.
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lished in the worldwide reinsurance market. 2 64 However, no quantitative
measure of this third-party business was provided. Although the section 482
argument2 65 was not directly discussed, Ford supported its case by pointing
out that premiums "were based on arm's-length amounts which would have
been charged by unrelated insurers for comparable risks." 266 Ford stated that
such premiums paid by the various subsidiaries were never challenged as to
their reasonableness or disallowed as a deduction by the taxing authorities of
other countries.
267
The IRS contention in Ford is that the premiums received by Transcon
were in effect constructive dividends to Ford and that, hence, Ford's gross
income for 1970 should be increased by approximately $5.7 million.2 68 The
figure was computed by taking Transcon's gross underwriting income ($6.4
million) reduced by reinsurance paid ($0.6 million) and premiums paid by
certain subsidiaries which had no earnings and profits (S0.1 million). 269
The IRS challenge of the Ford captive is significant in that Transcon was
apparently structured and operated in accordance with usual insurance indus-
try practice. Thus, the case is a good test of whether the economic family2 7 0
theory espoused by the IRS is a sufficient basis to bar the parent a deduction
for the premium paid to a captive insurance subsidiary. There is a growing
indication, however, that the IRS is now willing to settle the matter out of
court.
2 7 1
There are other cases now in litigation. For example, Carnation Co. v.
Commissioner2 72 involves $1,755,000 in premiums for the reinsurance of an
independent insurer which was writing the property exposures at 135 United
States and Canadian facilities owned by Carnation. The captive reinsured
90% of the first $500,000 of any loss covered by the primary policy. There
was no indication that the captive was providing any third-party insurance.
Furthermore, its capitalization was only $120,000 in cash with the parent
agreeing to purchase 288,000 additional shares at $ 10 per share upon demand,
264. Id. at 10.
265. See text immediately preceding note 256 supra.
266. Petition for Appellant at 10, Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner, petition docketed. No.
3660-75 (T.C. Apr. 25, 1975).
267. Id.
268. Notice of Deficiency (L-2 1) from D. Alexander (Comm'r of IRS) to Ford Motor Co. (Jan.
29, 1975) (reference L-21 Code 430) (Explanation of Items (a)).
269. Petition for Appellant at 8-9, Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner, petition docketed, No.
3660-75 (T.C. April 25, 1976).
270. See discussion notes 211 & 214 supra.
271. The facts in the Ford case suggest a captive insurance company whose size and nature of
operation make it a formidable one for the IRS to challenge. There is a strong likelihood that the
IRS will not litigate the case to completion but will settle out of court. The terms of that
settlement are not yet available. Ford, IRS Near a Settlement, Bus. Ins., Dec. 26, 1977, at 1, col.
3.
272. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, petition docketed, No. 5793-76 (T.C. June 29, 1976);
see LeRoux, Carnation vs. IRS in Key Captive Case, Bus. Ins., Dec. 27, 1976, at 1. col. 1.
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thus giving the captive access to $3,000,000 in capital. 273 These facts suggest
that the risk bearing capacity was considerably more limited than was the
case in Ford. The use of parent guarantees or stock purchase agreements
would evidence a lack of risk shifting to the captive. Thus, a decision in
Carnation contrary to premium deductibility may not be representative of the
treatment of other captives.
In summary, the realities of corporate risk management in the 1970's will
result in an ever-increasing degree of direct self-assumption of risk. The
captive insurance company can serve as a vehicle to effect this result in a cost
effective manner. Although abuses are clearly possible, the captive insurance
subsidiary should be evaluated as to its bona fide nature on the basis of its
financial structure, mix of business, and operating procedures. The IRS
challenge rests largely on the contention that risk shifting, a prerequisite for a
valid insurance contract, cannot exist among members of the same economic
family. It is submitted that this position is too broadly drawn given the
existing case law precedents and the legislative intent. If there is an arm's-
length insurance company operation, then the entity should be taxed as such
and the parent should enjoy the same premium treatment that would result
with an independent insurer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fundamental purpose of this Comment has been to identify some of the
complex problems associated with the income taxation of corporate liabilities.
The major distinguishing element among the various risk financing alterna-
tives available is the treatment of the reserves associated with liabilities
incurred-but-not-paid. Such reserves have become increasingly significant for
modem corporations as a result of the explosion in corporate liabilities and the
associated decline in the ability of traditional risk transfer plans through
independent insurers to provide an economic vehicle for the financing of such
responsibilities.
The requirements of the "all events" test should be aligned with the
growing use of self-insurance among corporations. For example, in the
various no-fault liability areas, such as workers' compensation, liability is
certainly fixed by the physical events of the underlying incidents. A deduction
for such liabilities should be permitted in their year of occurrence if the
taxpayer can demonstrate a historical ability to estimate such liabilities to
within twenty percent of the actual value on an aggregate basis.
A trust as a vehicle for prefunding incurred liabilities can provide a reliable
basis to insure that such reserve funds will be available and used for the
actual payment of the subject liabilities. While section 461(f) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 does provide such a vehicle it is of limited practical
value. The regulations should be expanded to permit the size of the trust to be
tested on objective grounds (for example, by comparison of its initial size to
the amount of actual payments) in addition to the current Code allowances.
273. Petition for Appellant at 3-5, Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, petition docketed, No.
5793-76 (T.C. June 29, 1976).
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The captive insurance company can be a logical extension of a corporation's
risk management program without regard to its potential income tax advan-
tage. As more liberal treatment is afforded self-insurance and trust plans,
however, the captive should receive equivalent treatment. The standard for
granting a captive the status of a bona fide insurer under Code provisions
should be the existence of sufficient independent financial capacity to perform
on the accepted risks and an arm's-length operation in accordance with
insurance industry practices.
The modem corporation is often viewed as a vehicle for the equitable
distribution of the risk of loss associated with their products and operations
without regard to negligence or other standards of fault. It is a requirement
consistent with this burden that corporations be permitted to match their costs
of doing business with the associated revenues within the structure of the
income tax law. The increasingly liberal treatment for tax deductibility of
those reserves identified in this Comment and the changes recommended
where the law is still in a state of development will satisfy an important
corporate need. Proper regulation of such reserves (whether in terms of a
self-insurance program, trust, or captive insurance company) can be used to
insure the protection of the employees or third-parties asserting the liabilities
associated with the reserves in issue.
Richard F. Denning
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